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Abstract
We study how shocks to the forward-looking expectations of investors buying call and put options transmit
across the financial system. We introduce a new contagion measure, called asymmetric fear connectedness
(AFC), which captures the information related to “fear” on the two sides of the options market and can be used
as a forward-looking systemic risk monitoring tool. The decomposed connectedness measures provide timely
predictive information for near-future macroeconomic conditions and uncertainty indicators, and they contain
additional valuable information that is not included in the aggregate connectedness measure. The role of a
positive/negative “fear” transmitter/receiver emerges clearly when we focus more closely on idiosyncratic events
for financial institutions. We identify banks that are predominantly positive/negative receivers of “fear”, as well
as banks that positively/negatively transmit “fear” in the financial system.
Keywords: Implied Volatility, Asymmetric Connectedness, U.S. Financial Sector.
1 Introduction
Different expectations about future values of stocks extracted from call and put options influence system-wide
beliefs in the financial market. A shock to forward-looking market views associated with call options may then
propagate through the system with a different strength than a similar shock to put options information. The unequal
impact of “fears” spreading into the system may create asymmetric connections within the financial sector. In this
paper, we highlight the connections’ asymmetry on both sides of the stock options market, and we introduce a
new connectedness measure derived from the implied volatility extracted from individual financial institutions’
options. This tool can be beneficial for monitoring the level of “fear” connectedness in the financial sector by
exploiting forward-looking investors’ expectations. In particular, we would like to answer the following important
research question: “is there any signal relevant to economic downturns in the financial sector embedded in the
asymmetric fear connections?” To answer this question, we first produce a new dataset of daily implied volatility-
type measures from call options only and put options only, respectively. Then, we assemble a new asymmetric
fear connectedness index that is used as a forward-looking systemic risk monitoring tool.
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Our main focus on the connectedness of the main U.S. financial stocks is motivated by the idea that financial
institutions have always been under the magnifying glass of investors, practitioners and academics for their pivotal
role in systemic risk terms1. De Bandt and Hartmann (2002) and Allen et al. (2012) pointed out that the financial
sector’s systemic risk exposure may lead to macroeconomic decline and macroeconomic contagion, so it should
be closely monitored. Systemic risk in the financial sector has been identified to predict future economic down-
turns (Allen et al., 2012). In our work, we consider forward-looking information embedded in implied volatility
measures extracted from stock call and put options prices. Comparison of the both sides of the market yields an
important insight about asymmetric views of market participants about future volatility of the U.S. financial sector
that can be used to predict economic downturns as well as periods of exuberance.
The methodological framework for measuring connectedness is anchored in the financial connectedness litera-
ture, which is spanned by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012); Diebold and Yılmaz (2014);s seminal papers. While
the literature on volatility spillover and contagion is immense (see Bae et al., 2003; Engle et al., 2012; Beirne and
Fratzscher, 2013; Bekaert et al., 2014; Diebold and Yilmaz, 2015) or Gagnon and Karolyi (2006) for an excel-
lent survey, quantifying connectedness via variance decompositions from a vector autoregression approximation
model has attracted a great deal of attention recently. Previous literature relies on historical volatility measures,
but we believe that a more informative analysis can be achieved by employing information from the stock option
prices of individual companies, such that forward-looking measures can be calculated for “fear connectedness”.
Call and put options carry different information; hence, we further decompose the individual bank’s “fear” index
VIX into positive and negative components extracted from calls and puts only (henceforth denoted as VIX+ and
VIX− , respectively). In this paper, we refer to “fear” connectedness when fear is generated by the aggregated
VIX index, well known as the “fear” index in the literature. Thus, in order not to detach this label from the de-
composed implied volatility indexes, we denote positive “fear” connectedness when fear is generated by VIX+
and negative “fear” connectedness when fear is generated by VIX− .
We derive the asymmetric fear connectedness (AFC) index from stock option prices and study the interdepen-
dence among market expectations about individual institutions to see how they are connected within the financial
system network. The “fear” contagion within the financial system depends on the structure of the financial net-
work, its integration and diversification (see Elliott et al., 2014). Thus, we investigate the structural characteristics
of the system focusing on directional implied volatility (or “fear” ) connectedness. The paper is also related to
a growing strand of literature studying the asymmetric characteristics of volatility (see Barndorff-Nielsen et al.,
2010; Patton and Sheppard, 2015; Segal et al., 2015; Feunou et al., 2017; Kilic and Shaliastovich, 2018).
The main contribution in this paper is the construction of a forward-looking monitoring tool extracted from
stock option prices, that is, an asymmetric fear connectedness measure. When constructed from put options
only, the new measure reflects investors’ negative future expectations associated with “bad” volatility (e.g., Segal
et al., 2015), which could be linked to a possible decrease in economic growth and equity value and an increase
1Excellent discussions along this line can be found in Billio et al. (2012), Diebold and Yılmaz (2014) and Barunı´k and Krˇehlı´k (2018).
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in uncertainty (see Barunı´k et al., 2016; Feunou et al., 2017). Moreover, in some cases, volatility may reflect
a positive direction associated with events that may trigger higher returns (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2015)2. Thus,
there might be some events related to U.S. financial institutions that could be considered harmful because they
increase “bad” volatility and can transmit across the system, creating the negative connectedness. However, other
events that will increase “good” volatility and transmit across the system can create positive connectedness (see
Segal et al., 2015; Barunı´k et al., 2016; Feunou et al., 2017). For instance, Kilic and Shaliastovich (2018) found
a “synergy” between the good and bad components of the variance risk premium when they are included in the
same model, increasing return predicability compared to the aggregate measure of the variance premium. In
addition, they found that the variance premium decomposition uncovers long-horizon return predictability, where
the aggregate variance premium fails instead.
Since connectedness measures may be directly related to network theory and to systemic risk measures
(Diebold and Yılmaz, 2014), this study also contributes to the systemic risk literature. Fundamental information
transmission from one bank to another has also been considered as a source of banks’ connectedness. Correlated
returns among banks can make depositors and investors run from one bank to another, generating panic (Chen,
1999). Banks might be further linked through deposits or asset liquidity (see Dasgupta, 2004; Cespa and Fou-
cault, 2014). Systemic risk may also come from the interaction between asset commonality and funding maturity
through an informational channel. This systemic risk is higher, especially when bad information about banks’
future solvency arrives in the economy and the asset structures are clustered (see Allen et al., 2012). All these
market situations can be better understood in a more general framework for banks’ information contagion based
on volatility, since good or bad news in relation to the bank influences the banks’ stock volatility.
In contrast to the previous literature measuring systemic risk, we provide an ex ante systemic risk alarm bell
extracted from the individual U.S. financial stock option prices in order to anticipate the propagation of systemic
risk in the financial sector3. Barunı´k and Krˇehlı´k (2018) argue that changes in investors’ expectations will have a
significant impact on the market. Thus, by considering decomposed implied volatility indexes, we can shed new
light on directional forward-looking connectedness measures.
We focus on the separate behavior of the connectedness of single equity VIX indexes. Our analysis indicates
that the negative implied volatility inflates mainly during turbulent periods, reflecting “fear” among investors.
Employing the asymmetric fear connectedness measure for the ten main U.S. financial institutions, we identify a
clear predominance of “fear” connectedness coming from positive implied volatility. We examine the predictive
power of our connectedness measures with respect to macroeconomic and uncertainty indicators in the spirit
of Allen et al. (2012), and we find that the decomposed fear connectedness measures perform better than the
aggregate measure and they can predict future economic activity, recession and VIX level. We also provide
2Connectedness can create links between the sources and uses of funds, as savings are channeled into investments, international trade,
regional and global capital market integration, and the coordination of global financial regulation and accounting standards (see Diebold and
Yilmaz, 2015).
3Other measures of systemic risk that are based on interconnectedness and network spillovers among banks and financial institutions are
discussed in Billio et al. (2012), Diebold and Yılmaz (2014) and Hautsch et al. (2014).
3
a ranking of the top ten financial institutions in the U.S. by classifying them into net positive or net negative
transmitters or receivers. In addition, we confirm the different roles played by VIX+ and VIX− on the net fear
connectedness indexes, especially when we focus on specific company events.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and it illustrates the calcula-
tion of the individual financial stocks’ implied volatility indexes and their decomposition into positive and negative
measures. Section 3 introduces the computation of ex ante asymmetric fear connectedness measure. Section 4 re-
ports the results for the static and dynamic analyses in relation to the aggregate implied volatility measures, while
Section 5 shows the static and dynamic results with regards to the positive and negative asymmetric measures. In
Section 6, a series of results are reported, highlighting the predictive power of the “fear” connectedness measures
for future levels of economic indicators and uncertainty proxies. In addition, we also investigate the net positive
and net negative connectedness for specific financial institutions. The results are presented in Appendix C. Finally,
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Data and Implied Volatility Decomposition
Implied volatility reveals the market’s expectations and is often used as an ex ante measure of investor sentiment.
Since we aim to measure the ex ante connectedness of the U.S. financial sector, we apply the VIX methodology
(see CBOE, 2009) to create a proxy “VIX Index” for the ten main U.S. banks in our system.
2.1 Data on U.S. Financial Institutions
The study focuses on the following ten major financial institutions representing the financial sector of the U.S.
economy: J.P. Morgan (JPM), Bank of America (BAC), Wells Fargo (WFC), Citigroup (C), Goldman Sachs (GS),
Morgan Stanley (MS), U.S. Bancorp (USB), American Express (AXP), PNC Group (PNC) and Bank of New
York Mellon (BK). Daily option prices were collected from OptionMetrics4 for each of the banks, while financial
information and market prices are collected from Bloomberg.
The same set of firms has already been studied in the previous literature (see Diebold and Yılmaz, 2014;
Barunı´k and Krˇehlı´k, 2018) and, therefore, by keeping the same sample, we can compare our findings to those
of previous studies. The dataset ranges from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017, covering the most recent crisis and the
remarkable boom that occurred after the crisis. Our sample contains 4528 daily observations for each series.
Table 1 describes the characteristics of the U.S. financial companies in our sample. The company tickers are
reported in the second column and their main business area in the third column. Market capitalization and stock
price are considered both as the average values over the 2000-2017 period and as a 2017-only value.
4Data on U.S. stocks’ options are specifically collected from IvyDBUS/v3.1/History/IVYOPPRCD and IvyD-
BUS/v3.1.1/History/IVYOPPRCD at ftp.ivydb.com.
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Table 1: U.S. Financial Companies Description
Company Ticker Business MktCap Stock Price
Average 2017 Average 2017
JP Morgan Chase & Co. JPM Com Bank 165.046 371.052 46.91 106.94
Bank of America Corp. BAC Com Bank 155.131 307.912 26.33 29.52
Wells Fargo Co. WFC Com Bank 160.769 298.755 34.07 60.67
Citigroup Inc. C Com Bank 175.757 196.740 233.62 74.41
Goldman Sachs GS Inv Bank 70.304 99.816 141.35 254.76
Morgan Stanley MS Inv Bank 58.660 94.860 38.92 52.47
US Bancorp USB Com Bank 58.212 88.916 31.09 53.58
American Express AXP Credit Card 64.119 86.201 53.06 99.31
PNC Group PNC Com Bank 30.020 68.653 67.33 144.29
Bank of New York Mellon BK Com Bank 35.747 55.154 35.94 53.86
Notes: This table shows the main characteristics of each selected U.S. financial institution, including their tickers, their
business (commercial bank or investment bank), their market capitalization (in billions of U.S. dollars) and their stock
prices. These last two areas of financial information are reported both for the average period between 2000 and 2017 or
only for the end-of-the-year 2017.
2.2 Individual Positive and Negative Implied Volatilities of U.S. Financial Institutions
We apply the CBOE VIX index methodology as described in CBOE (2009) to a set of out-of-the-money (OTM)
financial stocks options for the ten main U.S. financial institutions. We compute the individual equity VIX index
for the j = 1, . . . , 10 banks
σ2VIXj =
2
T
n∑
i=1
∆Ki
K2i
erTQ(Ki)− 1
T
[
F
K0
− 1
]2
, (1)
where T is time to expiration, F is the forward index level derived from the put-call parity as F = erT [c(K,T )−
p(K,T )] + K with the risk-free rate r5, K0 is the reference price, the first exercise price less or equal to the
forward level F (K0 ≤ F ), and Ki is the ith OTM strike price available on a specific date (call if Ki > K0, put
if Ki < K0, and both call and put if Ki = K0). Q(Ki) is the average bid-ask of OTM options with exercise
price equal to Ki. If Ki = K0, it will be equal to the average between the ATM call and put price, relative to
the strike price, and ∆(Ki) is the sum divided by two of the two nearest prices to the exercise price K0, namely,
(Ki+1−Ki−1)
2 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. An interpolation between two expiration dates σ2VIXj (T1) and σ2VIXj (T2) yields
the equity VIX index for the jth stock
VIXj = 100
√
365
30
[
T1σ2VIXj (T1)
N2 − 30
N2 −N1 + T2σ
2
VIXj
(T2)
30−N1
N2 −N1
]
. (2)
In order to compute the positive and negative components of the single stock VIXj , we consider call options
and put options separately. Using call options (i.e., Ki ≥ K0) in the equation (1) will allow us to define a positive
implied volatility index for a given stock VIX+j . Employing put options instead (i.e., Ki ≤ K0) in the equation
(1) will allow us to define a negative implied volatility index for a given stock VIX−j . Hence, we obtain three daily
5The risk-free interest rate is considered as average of T1 and T2; thus, we use the U.S. 1-month T-Bill (commonly referred to as 1-month
Treasury Constant Maturity Rate and based on the U.S. Treasury yield curve rates) collected from FRED and matched on the expiration dates
of the financial stock options.
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implied volatility indexes: VIXj , VIX+j , and VIX
−
j for every bank considered in our sample.
Defining the sub-sample of options with strike prices above the reference price as K+i and the sub-sample
below the reference price as K−i , corresponding positive and negative variances are calculated as
σ2
VIX+j
=
2erT
T
n∑
i=1
∆K+i(
K+i
)2Q(K+i )− 1T
[
F
K0
− 1
]2
, (3)
σ2
VIX−j
=
2erT
T
n∑
i=1
∆K−i(
K−i
)2Q(K−i )− 1T
[
F
K0
− 1
]2
. (4)
Finally, the two implied volatility components VIX+j and VIX
−
j are determined from the following formulae
VIX+j = 100
√
365
30
[
T1σ2VIX+j
N2 − 30
N2 −N1 + T2σ
2
VIX+j
30−N1
N2 −N1
]
, (5)
VIX−j = 100
√
365
30
[
T1σ2VIX−j
N2 − 30
N2 −N1 + T2σ
2
VIX−j
30−N1
N2 −N1
]
, (6)
which are related to the VIX through the following approximate relationship6: VIX2j '
(
VIX+j
)2
+
(
VIX−j
)2
.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the VIX, VIX+, and VIX− of the ten main financial institutions.
Bank of America carries the highest aggregate VIX and VIX+ average values, followed by Citigroup, while
Morgan Stanley presents the highest VIX− average value. Bank of America also presents the highest maximum
values for VIX and VIX+ , while PNC Group shows the highest maximum value for VIX− . The lowest minimum
values for all the implied volatility series are found for American Express. The VIX− indexes are also the most
volatile series. The time dynamic of implied volatility series is illustrated in Figure A1 in the Appendix A.
Having computed an implied volatility index for the individual banks, we also define a financial sector implied
volatility index (WVIX), reflecting the ten main stock volatility indexes. This index is computed as the sum of
their single stock VIX weighted for their average market capitalizations as
WVIX =
10∑
j=1
wjVIXj , (7)
where wj are the weights based on the 2000-2017 average market capitalizations, as shown in Table 1, and VIXj
represents the aggregate implied volatility index. Analogous positive and negative implied volatility measures
WVIX+ and WVIX− can be computed from equation (7) using VIX+j and VIX
−
j instead of VIXj , respectively.
The WVIX indexes, namely, aggregate, positive and negative are plotted in Figure 1. Even though the main
component of the aggregate single stock VIX is generated by the call options, most of the time, we observe
6We decided not to weight negative information extracted from puts more than positive information extracted from calls. For this reason,
this relationship is not always exact, as when VIX index is decomposed, Ki = K0 might result in an ATM options price that is excluded
from calculations of the VIX− or VIX+ measures on one or another side of the distribution, whereas for the aggregate VIX , it is always
taken into account in the total distribution of prices as the average between the ATM call and put prices relative to the strike price.
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Table 2: Aggregate and Decomposed Implied Volatility Indexes - Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
JPM VIX 41.01 31.38 363.61 13.30 30.30 3.39 19.13
VIX+ 28.37 21.77 358.61 8.15 23.01 5.29 45.30
VIX− 26.98 20.62 268.63 7.55 22.03 3.92 24.34
BAC VIX 46.89 34.01 643.87 14.79 51.73 6.05 52.57
VIX+ 35.22 25.27 618.23 10.87 46.85 7.70 76.86
VIX− 26.55 18.97 319.89 6.60 24.84 3.86 24.98
WFC VIX 38.69 27.36 543.12 12.40 41.53 5.61 42.97
VIX+ 28.18 20.55 532.00 7.72 35.02 7.05 65.05
VIX− 23.36 16.58 325.87 7.57 24.13 5.97 53.63
C VIX 46.53 32.22 465.24 15.41 40.75 3.51 20.74
VIX+ 34.47 22.99 440.82 9.95 34.06 4.36 31.53
VIX− 28.07 20.25 262.44 6.29 22.90 3.31 19.14
GS VIX 36.16 29.81 231.30 15.84 19.75 3.47 21.69
VIX+ 25.03 21.68 111.24 10.04 10.77 1.95 9.11
VIX− 24.59 19.79 214.05 6.46 17.31 4.11 27.91
MS VIX 44.20 36.60 430.83 17.92 27.60 4.24 31.80
VIX+ 30.86 26.89 239.04 10.99 14.98 2.96 22.51
VIX− 29.35 23.22 347.55 7.18 24.20 4.59 33.27
USB VIX 34.62 27.89 177.17 12.56 19.90 2.32 10.59
VIX+ 25.02 20.61 132.94 6.71 14.91 2.09 8.76
VIX− 21.66 17.25 143.38 6.39 13.89 3.00 15.81
AXP VIX 34.36 28.35 189.25 12.05 19.42 3.02 16.02
VIX+ 24.25 19.67 123.65 6.54 12.88 2.42 11.60
VIX− 22.76 19.08 152.17 5.23 14.92 3.34 19.44
PNC VIX 34.48 28.16 451.50 12.69 24.42 6.22 69.37
VIX+ 24.13 20.73 165.13 9.05 13.31 3.81 26.75
VIX− 22.40 17.14 439.61 6.95 21.54 8.24 115.14
BK VIX 34.01 29.73 149.53 12.78 16.29 2.83 13.62
VIX+ 24.66 21.93 96.45 8.17 11.20 2.22 10.38
VIX− 21.70 18.64 116.43 6.68 12.71 3.03 15.27
Notes: The table shows the main descriptive statistics for the daily implied volatility indexes series for the ag-
gregate VIX and for the positive (VIX+ ) and negative (VIX− ) decomposed measures for the selected ten
main U.S. financial institutions (tickers in the table) between 03-01-2000 and 29-12-2017, for a total of 4528
observations for each series.
that in the case of financial market downturns, the negative component also increases in size, overpowering the
positive component. The figure also shows that before the financial crisis, the implied positive volatility is found
to be above the implied negative volatility, whereas the two decomposed implied volatility series become more
intertwined in the post-crisis period, highlighting the role of implied negative volatility during crises and reflecting
the investors’ increasing concern for other potentially similar events. This characteristic is also supported by the
graphs illustrated in Figure A1 in the Appendix A.
3 Asymmetric Fear Connectedness
System connectedness can be characterized well through variance decompositions from a vector autoregression
approximation model (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009, 2012). Variance decompositions provide useful information
about how much of the future variance of variable j is due to shocks in variable k. Aggregating variance de-
compositions then yields a simple way to measure how the system is interconnected. Diebold and Yılmaz (2014)
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Figure 1: The U.S. Financial Sector VIX Indexes
Notes: The figure shows the aggregate, positive and negative WVIX indexes for the ten major financial institutions, as computed through formula (7) as a market
cap weighted average of the selected ten financial companies in the U.S. The NBER recession periods are highlighted in grey. The selected period spans from
03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
further argue that variance decompositions are closely linked to modern network theory and recently proposed
measures of various types of systemic risk, such as expected shortfall (Acharya et al., 2017) and CoVaR (Adrian
and Brunnermeier, 2016). However, the literature as a whole examines how shocks to volatility measured ex post
are transmitted across the system.
Employing forward-looking implied volatility measures, we aim to derive informatively different measures of
interconnectedness. Option prices reflect market participants’ expectations of future movements of the underlying
asset; hence, volatility implied by option prices carry forward-looking information superior to ex post volatility
(see Christensen and Prabhala, 1998). Individual equity VIX indexes as derived in the previous section essentially
measure the risk-neutral expected volatility. We are naturally interested in knowing how a shock to the expected
volatility of a stock j will transmit to future expectations about the volatility of a stock k. Aggregating this
information can provide a system-wide measure of forward-looking connectedness that will measure how strongly
the investors’ expectations are interconnected.
To construct the asymmetric fear connectedness measures, we use the implied volatility indexes computed
for the main financial institutions in combination with connectedness measures based on generalized variance
decompositions of a vector autoregressive (VAR) approximation model due to Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). In
particular, we consider a covariance stationaryN -variate process VIX∗t = (VIX
∗
1,t, . . . ,VIX
∗
N,t)
′ at t = 1, . . . , T
described by the VAR model of order p as
VIX∗t = Φ1VIX
∗
t−1 + Φ2VIX
∗
t−2 + . . .+ ΦpVIX
∗
t−p + t, (8)
with Φ1, . . . ,Φp coefficient matrices, and t being white noise with a (possibly non-diagonal) covariance matrix
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Σ. In this model, each variable is regressed on its own p lags, as well as the p lags of all of the other variables in the
system; hence, matrices of the coefficients contain complete information about the connections between variables.
It is useful to work with (N ×N) matrix lag-polynomial Φ(L) = [IN −Φ1L − . . . −ΦpLp] with IN identity
matrix, as the model can be written concisely as Φ(L)VIX∗t = t. Assuming that the roots of |Φ(z)| lie outside
the unit circle, the VAR process has the following vector moving average (i.e., MA(∞)) representation: VIX∗t =
Ψ(L)t, where Ψ(L) matrix of infinite lag polynomials can be calculated recursively from Φ(L) = [Ψ(L)]−1
and is key to understanding dynamics. Since Ψ(L) contains an infinite number of lags, it must be approximated
with the moving average coefficients Ψh calculated at h = 1, . . . ,H horizons. The connectedness measures rely
on variance decompositions, which are transformations of the Ψh and allow the measurement of the contribution
of shocks to the system.
To construct connectedness measures of aggregate, as well as decomposed implied volatility, we consider
different vectors VIX∗t ∈
{
VIXt,VIX
+
t ,VIX
−
t
}
. Since a shock to a variable in the model does not necessarily
appear alone, i.e., orthogonally to shocks to other variables, an identification scheme is a crucial step in the
calculation of variance decompositions. Standard approaches relying on Cholesky factorization depend on the
ordering of the variables and complicate the measures. The generalized identification proposed by Pesaran and
Shin (1998) produces variance decompositions that are invariant to ordering. Generalized variance decompositions
can be written in the form7 (
θH
)
j,k
=
σ−1kk
∑H
h=0 ((ΨhΣ)j,k)
2∑H
h=0(ΨhΣΨ
′
h)j,j
, (9)
where Ψh is a (N × N) matrix of moving average coefficients at lag h defined above, and σkk = (Σ)k,k. The(
θH
)
j,k
denotes the contribution of the kth variable to the variance of forecast error of the element j, at horizon
h. As the rows of the variance decomposition matrix θH do not necessarily sum to one, each entry is normalized
by the row sum as (
θ˜
H
)
j,k
=
(
θH
)
j,k
/
N∑
k=1
(
θH
)
j,k
.
Now the
∑N
j=1
(
θ˜
H
)
j,k
= 1 for any k and the sum of all elements in θ˜
H
is equal toN , by construction. Note that(
θ˜
H
)
j,k
provides a pairwise measure of connectedness from j to k at horizon H . The connectedness measure is
then defined as the share of variance in the forecasts contributed by errors other than own errors or as the ratio of
the sum of the off-diagonal elements to the sum of the entire matrix (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2012)
CH = 100 · 1∑
θ˜
H
·
∑
j 6=k
(
θ˜
H
)
j,k
, (10)
where the denominator signifies the sum of all elements of the θ˜
H
matrix. Hence, the connectedness is the relative
contribution to the forecast variances from the other variables in the system.
7 (A)j,k denotes the jth row and kth column of matrixA denoted in bold. (A)j,· denotes the full jth row; this is similar for the columns.
A
∑
A, where A is a matrix that denotes the sum of all elements of the matrix A.
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Similarly to the overall aggregate connectedness measure that infers the system-wide connectedness, we can
define measures that will reveal when an individual bank in the system is a volatility transmitter or receiver. The
directional connectedness that measures how much of each bank’s j variance is due to other banks j 6= k in the
system is given by
CHj←• = 100 ·
1∑
θ˜
H
·
N∑
k=1,j 6=k
(
θ˜H
)
j,k
, (11)
defining the so-called FROM connectedness. Likewise, the contribution of asset j to variances in other variables is
computed as
CHj→• = 100 ·
1∑
θ˜
H
·
N∑
k=1,j 6=k
(
θ˜H
)
k,j
, (12)
and this is the so-called TO connectedness. These two measures show how other assets contribute to the risk
of asset j, and how asset j contributes to the riskiness of others, respectively. Further, a measure showing the
discrepancy between how much of the variance is received, so-called NET connectedness, can be calculated as
CHj,NET = CHj→• − CHj←•. (13)
The NET connectedness measures whether a bank is inducing more risk than it receives from the other banks in the
system. Finally, one might be interested in pairwise relations of risk that can further be described by the PAIRWISE
connectedness measure given by
CHj,k = 100 ·
1∑
θ˜
H
·
((
θ˜H
)
k,j
−
(
θ˜H
)
j,k
)
. (14)
As discussed before, our main aim is to compare the connectedness of investors with fundamentally different
beliefs revealed by VIX+ and VIX− . In the spirit of Barunı´k et al. (2016), who define asymmetric spillover
measures based on the ex post realized semivariance, we consider the vectors VIX∗t ∈
{
VIXt,VIX
+
t ,VIX
−
t
}
holding information about aggregate, positive, and negative implied volatility and use it in the framework de-
scribed above. The measures of respective connectedness C for aggregate fear, C+ for positive, and C− negative
fear in the system can be readily calculated by using appropriate VIX∗ measures. When C+ 6= C−, we have asym-
metry in connectedness due to different investors’ expectations, which we define as the measure of asymmetric
fear connectedness (AFC)
AFC = C+ − C−. (15)
In other words, when AFC > 0, connectedness due to VIX+ is greater than connectedness due to VIX− , and
vice versa. In order to shed new light on the nature and sign of the transmitted or received volatility for every
financial institution in the system, we compute the positive directional NET as the difference between positive TO
and FROM, as
C+j,NET = C+j→• − C+j←•, (16)
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and the negative directional NET as the difference between negative TO and FROM as
C−j,NET = C−j→• − C−j←•. (17)
Finally, we compute the asymmetric directional NET as the difference between C+j,NET and C−j,NET as
AFCj,NET = C+j,NET − C−j,NET. (18)
In computations, we follow the previous literature and use the logarithmic of the volatility series, a forecast
horizon of twelve days, and a VAR order equal to four (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2012; Diebold and Yılmaz, 2014;
Barunı´k et al., 2016). We report the static forecast error variance decomposition matrix results both for the aggre-
gate measures and for the decomposed positive and negative measures in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively.
These connectedness measures are also studied dynamically over a 200-day rolling window8.
4 Fear Connectedness in the Financial Sector
We begin the empirical analysis by studying the aggregate level of the transmission of shocks to expectations
within the financial sector. The unconditional connectedness investigated in subsection 4.1 shows how individual
banks contributed to the distribution of “fear” in the financial system between 2000 and 2017. In addition, we
will also identify net fear transmitters and net fear receivers in the system. Looking at dynamic connectedness, we
follow (subsection 4.2) on the time dynamics of connections.
4.1 Fear Connectedness: Static Analysis
Table 3 reports the static analysis of “fear” connectedness for the ten main U.S. financial institutions. The diagonal
values in the Table 3 indicate that the future volatility of a stock is impacted by own shocks to expectations, which
range from 29.91% to 56.06%. Furthermore, the off-diagonal elements reveal how “fear” spreads from one bank
to other banks in the financial sector. The directional FROM connectedness measure ranges from 43.93% for Bank
of America to 70.08% for Bank of New York Mellon. The directional TO connectedness measure in the bottom
row of the table ranges from 19.92% for Bank of America to 108.85% for Goldman Sachs.
The FROM directional connectedness, which measures the exposure of a single bank j to shocks FROM the sys-
tem, is similar, in systemic risk terms, to the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MESj|mktT+1|T ) (see Acharya et al., 2017),
while the TO connectedness, which measures the contribution of the individual bank TO the volatility spillovers
in the system is, instead, similar to the CoVaR measure (∆CoV aRmkt|iT+1|T ) (see Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016).
The CoVar measures the systemic risk contribution conditional on market events to financial firms’ events and is
8We have also examined the static analysis within a range of different VAR lags and forecast horizons, respectively, such as p ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5},
and h ∈ {4, 6, 10, 14}, together with different rolling window sizes. The results do not change materially and are available from the authors
upon request.
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Table 3: Static Fear Connectedness in the Financial Sector
VIX Connectedness
JPM BAC WFC CITI GS MS USB AXP PNC BK FROM
JPM 46.98 2.16 3.58 3.26 10.36 9.46 8.69 6.63 2.06 6.77 53.01
BAC 4.03 56.06 3.04 3.28 8.20 7.05 5.67 4.99 1.65 5.98 43.93
WFC 6.93 1.78 44.41 4.61 11.11 6.37 7.19 5.63 5.66 6.26 55.58
CITI 5.23 2.09 3.44 54.67 8.92 7.20 5.69 5.44 2.33 4.94 45.32
GS 6.34 2.25 4.81 5.54 35.55 18.29 9.35 7.36 2.29 8.19 64.44
MS 6.91 2.58 4.12 5.11 20.29 34.34 8.59 6.40 2.86 8.74 65.65
USB 8.23 2.26 4.97 4.34 13.62 9.67 36.33 7.67 3.48 9.39 63.66
AXP 7.14 2.51 4.21 4.45 12.65 11.47 10.42 35.71 3.02 8.37 64.28
PNC 5.82 1.34 4.93 3.11 8.69 7.53 6.85 4.22 49.89 7.57 50.10
BK 7.19 2.90 4.25 4.21 14.97 14.50 10.38 7.77 3.87 29.91 70.08
TO 57.86 19.92 37.38 37.96 108.85 91.57 72.87 56.14 27.25 66.25 TOTAL
NET 4.84 -24.01 -18.19 -7.35 44.40 25.92 9.21 -8.13 -22.84 -3.82 57.61
Notes: The table contains a decomposition of forecast error variance computed for the aggregate VIX indexes for the ten main U.S.
financial institutions. Elements in the off-diagonal entries are the pairwise directional connectedness, while the diagonal elements (in
grey) are the financial institutions’ own variance. The off-diagonal row and column sum to TO and FROM connectedness, respectively.
The NET row at the bottom is the difference between TO and FROM. The bottom-right element is the total connectedness index in
the considered system. Selected VAR lags = 4 and Forecast Horizon = 12 days. The selected time period spans from 03-01-2000 to
29-12-2017.
exactly in the opposite direction of MES.
The pairwise values in the off-diagonal matrix entries indicate the directional connectedness between the two
companies crossing that entry. The highest pairwise connectedness appears to be from Goldman Sachs to Morgan
Stanley (20.29%). In other words, 20.29% of the future variation of VIX for Morgan Stanley is expected to be
generated by the shocks from Goldman Sachs. The second-highest number is in the opposite direction, going
from Morgan Stanley to Goldman Sachs (18.29%). The bottom row in the table shows the total directional NET
computed as difference between directional TO and directional FROM fear connectedness. A positive difference
reveals that the company can be classified as a “fear” transmitter, while a negative number identifies a “fear”
receiver. The main net aggregate “fear” transmitter is found to be Goldman Sachs (44.4%) followed by Morgan
Stanley (25.92%). J.P. Morgan Chase and U.S. Bancorp are also net aggregate “fear” transmitters. However, we
find that Bank of America, Wells Fargo and PNC Bank are, on average, the main aggregate “fear” receivers in the
system. The total “fear” connectedness index, bottom-right element, is found to be equal to 57.61%, which means
that, on average, more than half of the implied volatility (or “fears”) for these ten main financial institutions has
been generated from fear spillovers in the financial system.
4.2 Fear Connectedness: Time Dynamics
While the static analysis provides an average overview of the “fear” connectedness within the system, we are
further interested in gauging how the aggregate VIX connectedness evolves over time.
Figure 2 illustrates how the total “fear” connectedness index spiked twice in the early 2000s due to several
specific news and M&A deals in which some of the banks in our sample were involved and to the burst of the dot-
com bubble in March 2000. These events, in addition to others, such as the 9/11 terrorist attack, the Enron scandal
and the MCI WorldCom scandal, are found to have increased the total “fear” connectedness index at the end of
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Figure 2: Total Fear Connectedness Index
Notes: This figure shows the total “fear” connectedness for the ten main financial institutions’ aggregateVIX indexes. Selected VAR lags = 4 and forecast horizon
= 12. The rolling window length is equal to 200 days. The NBER recession periods are highlighted in grey. The selected period spans from 03-01-2000 to
29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
2001 from 45% to 75% in only one year. The index remained at high levels, close to 80%, for a few years until it
decreased in mid-2004. This period was followed by several smaller cycles corresponding to the U.S. tightening of
monetary policy and increases in long-term interest rates (see Diebold and Yılmaz, 2014). The total connectedness
index rose again in February 2007 in alignment with the beginning of the sub-prime crisis. After decreasing for
few months, it jumped up in mid-2007, increasing by more than 20% to levels near 80%. In the middle of the
global financial crisis, the index spiked again in accordance with the losses of Merrill Lynch and the collapse of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The index level remained high until 2011, given the intensification of the
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, which reached its record high of 85% at that moment. Eventually, after the global
financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis, the “fear” connectedness average value rose well above the pre-crisis
range. This level is found to increase even further, in line with Grexit and the Chinese Yuan crisis in mid-2015,
before decreasing in 2017. Overall, the dynamics show that shocks to expectations in individual banks play an
increasingly important role in the financial system.
4.3 Net Fear Receivers and Transmitters
Time-varying NET directional fear connectedness provides a more detailed analysis of the connections among
banks. Table 4 reports a cumulative ranking for the directional NET measures, describing the main aggregate
“fear” transmitters or receivers within the system.
Table 4 documents how the financial institutions change their roles as “fear” transmitters or receivers according
to the specific market period. We rank the banks according to their aggregate VIX cumulative net directional
connectedness for different time ranges, namely, every year, every two years, in the pre-crisis, during crisis and
post-crisis periods and, lastly, over the total time period. Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup
are classified as the main aggregate net “fear” transmitters, according to the one-year and two-year cumulative
rankings.
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Table 4: Cumulative Net Fear Receivers and Transmitters
Annual Cumulative Net Fear Receivers and Transmitters
Period JPM BAC WFC CITI GS MS USB AXP PNC BK
T R T R T R T R T R T R T R T R T R T R
2000 57.80 -0.26 0 -13.67 2.21 -7.14 11.79 -3.20 0 -19.51 0 -12.96 1.86 -5.41 2.81 -1.42 0 -20.99 8.87 -0.75
2001 29.48 -21.50 60.86 -4.26 1.96 -47.50 7.63 -30.40 33.88 -13.03 10.25 -46.91 9.42 -15.33 81.36 -1.99 21.01 -20.98 4.71 -58.67
2002 0.41 -71.95 40.70 -1.41 41.33 -39.74 65.17 -12.29 56.27 -1.30 31.66 -6.04 0.12 -76.52 12.17 -21.35 21.55 -41.24 20.33 -17.87
2003 23.24 -8.20 57.94 0 28.72 -38.30 17.34 -86.36 129.73 0 15.85 -17.74 13.37 -36.21 10.75 -12.31 25.37 -41.64 1.02 -82.57
2004 63.63 -7.91 19.14 -18.63 0.45 -48.02 12.29 -32.27 39.80 -2.48 6.17 -31.01 15.45 -9.75 33.86 -9.50 1.12 -53.79 50.23 -28.79
2005 12.14 -19.01 54.52 -20.75 21.54 -20.53 94.45 -3.87 19.49 -5.13 0 -85.59 15.65 -13.29 56.75 -20.68 7.17 -40.40 1.87 -54.35
2006 7.01 -27.15 10.15 -60.18 77.82 -5.75 66.88 -0.64 12.66 -6.57 3.04 -27.03 29.14 -39.80 3.01 -20.50 1.96 -45.70 28.55 -6.90
2007 65.34 -4.75 3.39 -47.70 8.53 -35.04 85.51 0 52.68 -3.07 5.26 -48.59 68.88 -4.33 2.25 -24.26 2.50 -107.86 13.98 -32.72
2008 55.38 -5.18 0.58 -65.76 1.41 -56.22 56.47 -0.14 49.41 -1.21 35.86 -33.93 91.68 -0.06 8.06 -35.02 7.89 -31.33 0 -77.88
2009 27.06 -4.06 9.53 -71.84 2.31 -56.59 25.20 -44.95 89.58 0 49.97 -2.68 17.58 -9.47 27.87 -6.81 5.67 -36.50 6.17 -28.04
2010 3.45 -15.55 12.85 -45.87 2.73 -28.11 2.85 -88.99 17.18 -17.09 7.84 -11.67 111.55 0 81.18 -1.30 21.74 -17.98 9.47 -44.28
2011 72.00 -0.04 16.91 -36.84 6.13 -98.45 1.97 -72.49 17.37 -6.80 12.28 -5.83 86.64 0 13.23 -36.78 24.59 -17.80 25.37 -1.47
2012 101.98 0 0 -86.04 83.08 0 0 -96.20 7.40 -24.90 0.29 -37.32 80.27 0 19.05 -56.91 19.99 -11.22 14.43 -13.90
2013 53.14 -11.16 3.75 -40.15 67.84 0 84.52 -7.34 27.06 -4.40 9.88 -70.09 1.10 -38.24 27.18 -38.16 2.76 -23.12 0.22 -44.80
2014 2.45 -47.30 43.50 -26.45 82.97 -0.05 90.60 0 69.85 0 5.30 -75.77 6.85 -34.62 6.11 -22.01 7.73 -21.03 0.70 -88.85
2015 40.45 -25.86 0 -82.90 2.59 -52.80 57.67 -30.53 149.01 0 121.89 -0.09 24.39 -1.04 0 -106.31 73.95 0 0 -170.41
2016 59.76 0 7.55 -18.45 32.44 -4.02 8.95 -33.07 71.84 0 50.10 0 7.48 -13.28 0 -142.96 29.70 -1.44 2.07 -56.68
2017 76.22 0 0 -11.06 1.00 0 2.26 -4.97 2.06 -0.43 0.90 -7.03 0.11 -85.15 0 -42.31 3.09 -42.49 0 -68.76
Two-Year Cumulative Net Fear Receivers and Transmitters
2000-2001 87.28 -21.77 60.86 -17.94 4.18 -54.65 19.42 -33.60 33.88 -32.54 10.25 -59.87 11.28 -20.75 84.18 -3.41 21.01 -41.97 13.59 -59.42
2002-2003 23.65 -80.16 98.64 -1.41 70.06 -78.04 82.52 -98.65 186.00 -1.30 47.51 -23.79 13.50 -112.74 22.93 -33.67 46.92 -82.88 21.35 -100.44
2004-2005 75.78 -26.93 73.67 -39.39 21.99 -68.55 106.75 -36.14 59.30 59.30 6.17 -116.60 31.11 -23.05 90.61 -30.18 8.30 -94.19 52.11 -83.15
2006-2007 72.36 -31.91 13.54 -107.89 86.35 -40.79 152.39 -0.64 65.34 -9.64 8.31 -75.63 98.02 -44.14 5.26 -44.76 4.47 -153.56 42.53 -39.63
2008-2009 82.45 -9.24 10.12 -137.61 3.73 -112.81 81.67 -45.09 139.00 -1.21 85.83 -36.62 109.26 -9.53 35.93 -41.84 13.57 -67.84 6.17 -105.93
2010-2011 75.45 -15.60 29.77 -82.72 8.87 -126.56 4.83 -161.49 34.56 -23.90 20.13 -17.51 198.19 0 94.42 -38.09 46.33 -35.79 34.84 -45.75
2012-2013 155.13 -11.16 3.75 -126.19 150.92 0 84.52 -103.54 34.47 -29.31 10.17 -107.42 81.37 -38.24 46.24 -95.07 22.75 -34.34 14.65 -58.71
2014-2015 42.91 -73.17 43.50 -109.35 85.56 -52.85 148.27 -30.53 218.86 0 127.19 -75.86 31.25 -35.67 6.11 -128.32 81.69 -21.03 0.70 -259.26
2016-2017 135.99 0 32.88 -29.83 87.35 -4.16 41.34 -38.31 123.05 -0.43 58.34 -7.03 8.75 -98.44 4.96 -185.84 39.00 -43.94 2.07 -126.05
Pre-, During-, Post-Crisis Cumulative Net Fear Receivers and Transmitters
Pre-Crisis 234.15 -160.78 243.33 -152.60 179.00 -229.27 335.53 -169.05 326.11 -51.08 72.26 -253.24 107.89 -200.68 202.41 -102.95 80.71 -336.80 129.60 -254.53
Crisis 81.74 -8.42 3.98 -132.35 248.60 -89.39 107.23 -12.73 103.14 -1.23 73.34 -56.75 140.51 -7.54 28.06 -44.45 7.89 -88.26 1.78 -112.93
Post-Crisis 435.14 -100.75 119.45 -367.09 334.71 -219.73 278.98 -365.97 464.44 -53.65 228.08 -210.52 334.26 -174.34 160.21 -453.37 195.03 -151.04 56.67 -510.48
Total Period Cumulative Net Fear Receivers and Transmitters
2000-2017 751.04 -269.97 366.77 -652.05 519.04 -538.31 721.75 -547.76 893.70 -105.97 373.69 -520.36 582.67 -382.58 390.68 -600.65 283.64 -575.60 188.06 -877.78
Notes: The table shows the cumulative net aggregate “fear” receivers and transmitters for the ten main U.S. financial institutions. The aggregate VIX NET measure is computed as the difference between aggregate VIX TO and aggregate VIX FROM measures. When
this difference is positive the financial institution can be classified as a net aggregate “fear” transmitter (T), while, when negative, it can be classified as a net aggregate “fear” receiver (R). The ranking is reported for every year and every two years for the pre-crisis,
during-crisis and post-crisis periods and for the total period. For every considered period, the main “fear” transmitters and the main “fear” receivers are highlighted in bold. Selected VAR lags = 4 and Forecast Horizon = 12. The rolling window length is equal to 200
days. The selected period spans from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
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Bank of New York Mellon, PNC Bank and Bank of America are found to be the main financial institutions
receiving “fear” from the system in the one-year and two-year period cumulative ranking. Citigroup and PNC
Bank are identified as the main “fear” transmitter and receiver, respectively, in the pre-crisis period. Wells Fargo
and Bank of America are the main transmitter and receiver, respectively, during the global financial crisis and
Goldman Sachs and Bank of New York Mellon the main transmitter and receiver, respectively, post-crisis. Over
the whole period, we observe that the main “fear” transmitters are Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan Chase, while
the main “fear” receivers are Bank of New York Mellon and Bank of America. Figure ?? in Appendix B further
complements the analysis as it plots the time dynamics of the aggregate directional connectedness. In the next
Section 5, we study whether the financial institutions’ roles are confirmed when we take into account positive and
negative implied volatility indexes.
5 Asymmetric Fear Connectedness in the Financial Sector
5.1 Asymmetric Fear Connectedness: Static Analysis
Table 5 illustrates the asymmetry of the connectedness results emerging from the forecast error variance decom-
positions of VIX+ and VIX− . The positive “fear” connectedness and the negative “fear” connectedness are
reported in the upper and bottom panels, respectively. The overall connectedness from VIX+ (33.19%) is smaller
than the total connectedness computed using the VIX index. The on-diagonal entries show that more than half of
the fear in the system is generated by banks’ own shocks to their VIX+ rather than external shocks. The positive
directional FROM connectedness (right column) is also found to be lower than the aggregate, with values between
19.32% for Citigroup to 46.84% for Morgan Stanley, while the positive directional TO connectedness ranges from
11.81% for Bank of America to 61.02% for Goldman Sachs.
Although the strength of connection is lower, Goldman Sachs is still found to be the main “fear” transmitter
in the system (19.33%), followed by Citigroup (9.05%). Morgan Stanley is detected as a positive “fear” receiver
(-2.37%). We also find U.S. Bancorp to be a positive “fear” transmitter, while J.P. Morgan Chase is found to be a
“fear” receiver. PNC Bank, Bank of America and Bank of New York Mellon can be classified, on average, as the
main positive “fear” receivers in the system. The highest positive pairwise connectedness is from Goldman Sachs
to Morgan Stanley (17.76%) and, second, from Morgan Stanley to Goldman Sachs (12.18%) again.
On the bottom panel of Table 5, we observe that the negative “fear” connectedness is even lower, being equal
to 26.22%, which implies that only a quarter of all financial institutions’ negative “fear” is generated by “fear”
transmission within the system. The on-diagonal elements point to an even stronger role of the own shocks. The
range of the negative directional FROM values is even narrower than in the case of the positive volatility analysis,
with the lowest value equal to 19.26% for Citigroup and the highest value equal to 34.97% for Morgan Stanley.
The negative directional TO connectedness is also quite low, except for Goldman Sachs, which transferred to the
system most of the negative “fear” , making it the main net volatility transmitter. PNC Bank is found to have the
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Table 5: Asymmetric Fear Connectedness in the Financial Sector
VIX+ Connectedness
JPM BAC WFC CITI GS MS USB AXP PNC BK FROM
JPM 73.69 0.79 1.55 1.67 4.11 5.28 5.53 2.79 0.73 3.82 26.30
BAC 0.90 79.51 1.85 3.36 2.28 2.52 0.80 3.63 0.90 4.20 20.48
WFC 3.04 0.88 72.25 3.53 6.20 1.39 3.80 4.13 1.01 3.70 27.74
CITI 0.72 2.05 2.10 80.67 4.04 1.73 1.48 2.79 1.88 2.49 19.32
GS 2.50 1.09 4.78 4.05 58.31 12.18 5.95 5.31 1.15 4.63 41.68
MS 4.05 1.76 2.39 3.56 17.76 53.15 4.03 3.64 1.88 7.72 46.84
USB 4.72 0.39 4.00 2.94 7.15 2.66 63.83 5.59 2.53 6.13 36.16
AXP 2.70 1.70 3.90 2.83 7.81 4.79 5.98 63.34 1.95 4.96 36.65
PNC 2.61 0.92 2.77 3.78 3.92 3.80 4.90 4.05 68.42 4.77 31.57
BK 3.67 2.17 3.46 2.61 7.71 10.08 6.52 5.98 2.90 54.85 45.14
TO 24.96 11.81 26.85 28.37 61.02 44.46 39.02 37.95 14.97 42.45 TOTAL
NET -1.33 -8.66 -0.88 9.05 19.33 -2.37 2.85 1.29 -16.59 -2.68 33.19
VIX− Connectedness
JPM BAC WFC CITI GS MS USB AXP PNC BK FROM
JPM 73.08 1.50 0.54 3.86 5.04 3.45 6.28 3.97 0.69 1.54 26.91
BAC 0.89 80.11 3.92 2.68 2.57 4.19 2.79 0.45 0.91 1.45 19.88
WFC 1.79 2.75 73.53 4.57 5.42 1.83 2.08 2.69 2.99 2.29 26.46
CITI 2.43 2.33 2.82 80.73 2.42 2.57 1.71 2.10 1.09 1.76 19.26
GS 1.43 0.91 3.40 2.80 71.83 10.39 4.13 3.01 0.58 1.48 28.16
MS 2.85 2.24 2.25 3.71 15.69 65.02 2.90 1.32 0.83 3.15 34.97
USB 6.54 1.89 1.69 3.07 6.43 3.33 71.05 4.05 0.68 1.20 28.94
AXP 3.13 0.24 3.20 4.96 8.58 2.30 6.58 67.32 1.80 1.84 32.67
PNC 2.57 1.48 2.75 1.61 4.77 0.94 1.32 2.49 80.72 1.28 19.27
BK 1.23 2.60 3.79 3.61 4.04 5.79 1.47 1.82 1.27 74.32 25.67
TO 22.92 15.99 24.37 30.92 55.01 34.84 29.29 21.94 10.87 16.03 TOTAL
NET -3.98 -3.89 -2.08 11.65 26.84 -0.12 0.35 -10.72 -8.39 -9.64 26.22
Notes: The table contains forecast error variance decomposition computed for the VIX+ andVIX− indexes for the ten main U.S.
financial institutions. Elements in the off-diagonal entries are the pairwise directional connectedness, while the diagonal elements (in
grey) are the financial institutions’ own variance. The off-diagonal row and column sums to TO and FROM directional connectedness,
respectively. The NET row at the bottom is the difference between TO and FROM. The bottom-right element is the total connectedness
index in the considered system. Selected VAR lags = 4 and Forecast Horizon = 12 days. The selected time period spans from
03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017.
lowest negative directional TO (10.87%), thus being one of the main net negative “fear” receivers, alongside Bank
of New York Mellon and American Express. American Express changed its role from positive “fear” transmitter
to negative “fear” receiver. In addition, the highest pairwise value of negative “fear” connectedness is found to be
the one from Goldman Sachs to Morgan Stanley (15.69%), followed by the pair from Morgan Stanley to Goldman
Sachs (10.39%).
Overall, these results show how some of the selected financial institutions change their roles from a net receiver
to a net transmitter, or vice versa, when comparing aggregate to positive and negative implied volatility (or “fear”
) shocks, confirming asymmetries in the transmission mechanism. For instance, J.P. Morgan Chase is found to
be an aggregate “fear” transmitter, whereas separate VIX+ and VIX− show that it is found to be a positive and
negative “fear” receiver. The opposite is found for Citigroup. Morgan Stanley’s role as a “fear” transmitter is
confirmed in the aggregate and negative case, while it is also found to be a positive “fear” receiver. Goldman
Sachs is found to be the main winner in the financial sector, being an average “fear” transmitter, regardless of the
nature of the volatility measure. PNC Bank, Bank of America and Bank of New York Mellon are, on the other
hand, the weakest banks, given that they receive volatility from the system, regardless of the volatility measure.
The static picture may hide the different roles that positive and negative implied volatility (or “fear” ) connect-
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edness have in relation to the different market periods. However, the next section 5.2 provides a more in-depth
understanding of their separate roles by studying their changes over time.
5.2 Asymmetric Fear Connectedness: Time Dynamics
In Figure 3, we depict the fear connectedness indexes as computed from equation (10) and the asymmetric fear
connectedness as computed from equation (15) over time.
Figure 3: Fear Connectedness Indexes and AFC
Notes: The figure shows the comparison between the VIX , VIX+ , and VIX− connectedness indexes, namely, C, C+ and C−, in the upper panel. The bottom
panel shows the asymmetric fear connectedness (AFC). Selected VAR lags = 4 and forecast horizon = 12. The rolling window length is equal to 200 days. The
NBER recession periods are highlighted in grey. The selected period spans from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
Figure 3 confirms our preliminary finding that the connectedness due to positive “fear” plays a stronger role
in the financial sector for the entire study period. However, in some specific periods, such as during the two
recessions and during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the negative “fear” connectedness increases. The peak
in negative connectedness during 2006 can be justified by the extreme uncertainty about a possible U.S. housing
bubble burst. The bottom plot in the Figure 3 shows that positive and negative “fear” connectedness become more
intertwined depending on recessions, turbulent periods or crises. Overall, it appears that positive “fear” is the main
factor to understand how the volatility of single U.S. financial companies is transmitted.
Further details can be inferred from Figure 3 by looking at the evolution of C+ and C− over time. C+ spikes
exactly before the 2000-2001 dot-com bubble, also dragging up the aggregate connectedness index, C. As soon as
the bubble burst, the positive connectedness index dropped. C− is found to be lower than C+ before the recession,
while it increased and remained at the same level in the midst of the recession. During 2002 and 2003, C+ was
almost 50% higher than C−, but at the end of 2004, this trend inverted, with C− overcoming C+ until mid-2006.
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Beginning in 2007, we find an increase in both the positive and negative “fear” connectedness indexes, with the
AFC showing a positive-negative break at the end of 2006 and in September 2008. The two indexes spiked again
at the beginning of 2011 with C− overcoming C+, dragging the AFC below zero, in accordance with the Eurozone
sovereign debt crisis. After that, the C− and C+ average values increased even further. We also notice an increase
in the C− index when a crisis, recession or turbulent period impacted the U.S. financial sector.
In order to verify the different behaviors of the “fear” connectedness indexes, we compute a new ratio as C− on
C+, which should better capture the relative role of C−. Indeed, put options reflect investors’ negative expectations
and beliefs about future financial and economic downturns since they are traded as insurance assets (e.g., Bollen
and Whaley, 2004; Ang et al., 2006; Bondarenko, 2014). The C−/C+ ratio is plotted in the following Figure 4.
Remarkably, this ratio had an abrupt rise and an equally rapid fall between 2005 and 2006, foreshadowing the
subprime crisis.
Figure 4: Asymmetric Fear Connectedness Ratio: C−/C+
Notes: The figure shows the ratio between the “fear” connectedness index computed from puts only, C−, and the one computed from calls only, C+. Selected
VAR lags = 4 and forecast horizon = 12. The rolling window length is equal to 200 days. The NBER recession periods are highlighted in grey. The selected period
spans from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
5.3 Asymmetric Net Fear Receivers and Transmitters
In this section, we analyze how the financial institutions can be classified as net positive or net negative “fear”
transmitters or receivers. Tables 6 and 7 rank the ten main banks according to their cumulative net positive and
net negative “fear” transmitter or receiver role. We rank the financial institutions according to the results gathered
every year, every two years, during the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods, and over the total time frame.
From Table 6, J.P. Morgan Chase confirms its role as a main positive “fear” transmitter within the system at
an annual frequency, being the top ranking transmitter over half of the period. Citigroup follows as a second main
positive “fear” transmitter on an annual basis. On the other hand, Bank of New York Mellon is found as the main
positive “fear” receiver on an annual basis, with PNC Bank and Morgan Stanley ranking next. Repeating this
exercise at the two-year grouping, overall, the same ranking is obtained, namely, J.P. Morgan Chase is found to be
the main positive “fear” transmitter and Bank of New York Mellon the main positive “fear” receiver.
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Table 6: Cumulative Net Positive Fear Connectedness Receivers and Transmitters
Annual Cumulative Net Positive Fear Connectedness Receivers and Transmitters
Period JPM BAC WFC CITI GS MS USB AXP PNC BK
T R T R T R T R T R T R T R T R T R T R
2000 34.62 0 0 -8.42 3.86 -2.63 1.23 -5.47 3.20 -0.25 0 -9.45 1.28 -3.12 0 -6.64 0 -13.43 5.46 -0.23
2001 52.05 -0.20 7.92 -24.05 0.47 -21.60 4.35 -32.46 49.69 -1.93 36.24 -17.55 11.21 -9.59 17.78 -12.39 6.19 -19.25 0.28 -47.13
2002 28.06 -4.08 15.67 -21.23 12.61 -45.76 87.55 -12.71 29.34 -14.87 41.10 -13.36 1.05 -40.24 3.26 -50.19 14.97 -11.09 15.78 -35.83
2003 117.42 -1.48 5.06 -28.69 25.35 -38.53 36.55 -60.45 105.35 -0.95 0.42 -65.88 7.73 -8.22 5.73 -45.92 11.47 -11.83 10.81 -63.54
2004 22.04 -7.06 16.92 -9.64 0 -33.06 18.00 -11.87 9.41 -5.78 10.50 -15.70 14.94 -7.30 0.42 -30.18 34.97 -11.05 15.34 -10.89
2005 5.44 -11.72 9.93 -26.46 0.23 -33.53 23.53 -14.54 33.06 -8.74 39.81 -13.08 28.88 -4.78 0.12 -21.06 23.30 -26.20 5.76 -9.96
2006 0.66 -28.58 11.75 -25.93 33.37 -3.35 0.13 -33.49 21.49 -6.58 23.61 -39.40 25.78 -7.49 25.10 -6.05 3.13 -26.06 35.41 -3.50
2007 62.48 -0.65 1.96 -43.85 0.98 -46.40 87.80 -1.63 41.49 -0.81 4.75 -34.59 42.55 -1.00 44.78 -18.52 1.14 -60.83 0 -79.64
2008 124.07 0 3.21 -36.33 0.04 -68.10 88.18 -0.39 38.50 -2.12 21.06 -15.74 18.83 -15.64 3.13 -69.30 8.19 -22.74 0 -74.84
2009 62.11 -7.60 47.17 -34.16 3.19 -33.70 4.57 -38.17 60.15 -4.50 23.31 -11.87 10.10 -23.00 41.89 -2.97 10.30 -40.29 1.01 -67.56
2010 101.81 -1.41 27.18 -20.80 8.35 -38.87 0 -61.36 47.23 -7.16 0.51 -35.35 14.49 -22.95 60.93 -3.97 17.04 -32.79 5.33 -58.20
2011 107.92 -0.12 0 -55.48 11.84 -25.94 1.23 -37.42 13.99 -16.57 5.51 -54.13 7.50 -27.54 70.42 -11.66 26.76 -14.81 8.69 -10.19
2012 151.02 0 0 -102.13 63.01 -33.45 8.50 -34.72 51.42 -27.26 23.32 -19.39 37.72 -4.16 1.71 -34.87 0.15 -65.18 12.18 -27.87
2013 70.79 -2.01 0.01 -55.81 1.50 -60.83 269.07 0 71.50 -28.11 10.60 -28.60 0 -60.57 10.12 -29.69 0 -68.96 0 -99.00
2014 52.54 -7.73 24.66 -7.60 132.74 0 195.24 0 6.47 -80.79 36.78 -30.47 1.29 -60.99 0 -86.40 0.40 -82.68 0.20 -93.67
2015 77.85 -0.21 0.27 -56.83 127.94 -9.98 48.79 -34.30 20.52 -49.90 106.17 0 0.07 -61.74 5.62 -43.64 0.08 -81.37 0.21 -49.55
2016 36.89 -0.59 1.69 -51.69 91.98 -9.09 5.76 -14.30 19.67 -13.89 35.01 -5.28 3.59 -15.42 28.87 -25.88 0.95 -60.76 6.18 -33.69
2017 23.72 -0.46 35.34 -8.79 69.53 -1.44 0.01 -57.34 49.77 -3.90 20.13 -31.60 8.19 -47.82 56.52 -17.57 2.31 -37.42 0 -59.20
Two-Year Cumulative Net Positive Fear Connectedness Receivers and Transmitters
2000-2001 86.67 -0.20 7.92 -32.48 4.34 -24.24 5.59 -37.93 52.90 -2.19 36.24 -27.01 12.49 -12.72 17.78 -19.04 6.19 -32.69 5.74 -47.36
2002-2003 145.48 -5.57 20.73 -49.93 37.96 -84.30 124.11 -73.16 134.70 -15.83 41.15 -79.25 8.78 -48.47 9.00 -96.12 26.45 -22.93 26.59 -99.38
2004-2005 27.48 -18.79 26.85 -36.10 0.23 -66.59 41.53 -26.42 42.48 42.48 50.32 -28.78 43.83 -12.09 0.54 -51.25 58.28 -37.26 21.10 -20.85
2006-2007 63.14 -29.24 13.72 -69.79 34.35 -49.76 87.93 -35.12 62.99 -7.40 28.36 -74.00 68.34 -8.50 69.89 -24.58 4.28 -86.90 35.41 -83.15
2008-2009 186.18 -7.60 50.38 -70.50 3.24 -101.81 92.75 -38.56 98.66 -6.63 44.37 -27.62 28.94 -38.64 45.03 -72.27 18.50 -63.04 1.01 -142.41
2010-2011 209.74 -1.53 27.18 -76.28 20.20 -64.81 1.23 -98.78 61.22 -23.74 6.02 -89.49 21.99 -50.50 131.36 -15.63 43.80 -47.60 14.02 -68.39
2012-2013 221.82 -2.01 0.01 -157.95 64.51 -94.29 277.57 -34.72 122.92 -55.37 33.93 -47.99 37.72 -64.73 11.84 -64.57 0.15 -134.14 12.18 -126.87
2014-2015 130.40 -7.95 24.94 -64.44 260.68 -9.98 244.03 -34.30 26.99 -130.69 142.96 -30.47 1.36 -122.73 5.62 -130.05 0.48 -164.05 0.41 -143.22
2016-2017 60.62 -1.05 37.04 -60.49 161.51 -10.53 5.78 -71.64 69.45 -17.79 55.15 -36.88 11.79 -63.25 85.40 -43.45 3.26 -98.19 6.18 -92.89
Pre-, During-, Post-Crisis Cumulative Net Positive Fear Connectedness Receivers and Transmitters
Pre-Crisis 296.65 -53.72 67.45 -176.46 76.90 -192.43 200.40 -172.65 286.35 -39.15 151.48 -206.16 117.03 -81.70 93.77 -172.67 95.21 -152.90 88.85 -226.25
Crisis 156.85 -4.38 4.99 -81.24 346.20 -105.24 151.53 -19.39 87.84 -2.94 45.08 -19.38 38.44 -30.44 33.67 -87.63 18.44 -52.26 0.07 -137.30
Post-Crisis 672.65 -15.86 136.46 -344.05 508.77 -209.63 528.76 -259.05 295.44 -234.59 239.37 -219.47 80.93 -308.60 247.85 -259.77 47.56 -482.80 36.70 -460.67
Total Period Cumulative Net Positive Fear Connectedness Receivers and Transmitters
2000-2017 1126.16 -73.97 208.92 -601.76 588.15 -507.16 880.70 -451.10 669.63 -276.68 435.94 -444.87 236.41 -420.75 375.30 -520.08 161.22 -687.78 125.64 -823.92
Notes: This table shows the cumulative net positive fear receivers and transmitters for the ten main U.S. financial institutions. The positive VIX NET directional measure is computed as the difference between the positive VIX TO and positive VIX FROM. When this
difference is positive, the financial institution can be classified as net positive fear transmitter (T), while, when negative, it can be classified as net positive fear receiver (R). The ranking is reported for every year and every two years, for the pre-crisis, during-crisis and
post-crisis periods, and for the total period. For every considered period, the main “fear” transmitters and the main “fear” receivers are highlighted in bold. Selected VAR lags = 4 and Forecast Horizon = 12. The rolling window length is equal to 200 days. The selected
period spans from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
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Table 7: Cumulative Net Negative Fear Connectedness Receivers and Transmitters
Annual Cumulative Net Negative Fear Connectedness Receivers and Transmitters
Period JPM BAC WFC CITI GS MS USB AXP PNC BK
T R T R T R T R T R T R T R T R T R T R
2000 1.95 -0.16 0.45 -1.53 0 -8.79 25.44 0 0.02 -4.67 0 -6.08 3.48 -0.60 0.31 -2.36 0 -5.45 0.82 -2.82
2001 19.42 -6.22 28.83 -0.57 0.80 -21.77 30.90 -2.68 39.45 -5.31 0 -50.46 10.77 -7.12 33.13 -0.07 0 -39.00 0 -30.10
2002 12.68 -29.32 43.84 -6.62 0 -52.33 33.48 -5.98 16.49 -3.88 2.67 -21.71 32.24 -2.19 33.36 -5.04 0.87 -33.95 10.57 -25.17
2003 9.99 -27.68 32.94 -3.13 0 -52.42 31.77 -4.96 45.54 -8.64 10.43 -11.47 30.91 -1.76 8.43 -35.24 11.93 -12.70 0.18 -24.13
2004 12.03 -6.76 23.72 -1.25 14.13 -13.77 4.51 -25.11 24.27 -2.76 7.72 -15.40 19.81 -7.25 2.43 -10.71 2.32 -20.28 6.86 -14.50
2005 17.35 -28.12 46.57 -4.40 18.26 -8.40 11.48 -12.31 37.70 -1.90 11.23 -11.63 0.85 -27.46 17.02 -6.07 5.97 -27.90 2.69 -40.91
2006 79.94 -0.05 6.94 -14.20 2.53 -32.44 19.43 -1.99 24.70 -1.35 0 -53.44 4.69 -17.69 12.56 -14.71 6.49 -6.62 1.57 -16.34
2007 10.16 -10.68 55.51 -0.27 17.94 -3.89 13.64 -31.31 51.93 -0.97 13.57 -16.28 4.02 -43.72 0 -53.23 1.89 -39.44 34.35 -3.20
2008 41.83 -18.84 11.01 -27.29 44.22 -20.31 4.24 -73.92 129.45 0 37.06 -7.75 11.24 -34.65 3.89 -25.14 7.33 -28.15 0.88 -55.10
2009 22.21 -13.86 0.18 -69.02 8.19 -51.68 13.91 -18.02 189.41 0 105.63 -1.72 1.75 -53.61 0 -82.85 24.91 -16.10 3.02 -62.35
2010 132.70 0 0 -71.57 14.78 -12.02 10.60 -21.99 65.95 -0.54 10.06 -55.89 27.40 -3.81 36.53 -5.91 7.05 -12.87 0 -120.47
2011 210.89 0 9.12 -13.17 2.20 -69.50 13.88 -17.07 15.61 -31.74 29.90 -6.91 72.93 -12.40 0.08 -68.23 0 -91.17 0.64 -45.05
2012 131.96 0 0 -58.05 141.43 0 23.69 -14.89 0.01 -67.17 4.68 -45.96 27.32 -8.92 3.09 -69.06 9.95 -70.55 16.23 -23.73
2013 29.03 -9.66 45.34 -17.91 108.62 -2.93 70.49 -7.91 3.93 -50.83 0.33 -36.56 2.81 -19.23 0.06 -67.46 1.31 -39.64 6.40 -16.21
2014 2.12 -38.98 40.52 -43.42 99.04 -0.35 135.83 0 36.63 -9.92 5.86 -35.61 0.08 -53.87 2.03 -52.82 6.43 -45.12 0.02 -48.50
2015 98.37 -31.42 0 -116.76 0.26 -49.38 111.12 -1.18 253.76 0 54.77 -11.84 8.24 -30.02 0 -142.70 21.50 -80.67 0 -84.05
2016 194.70 0 1.97 -90.66 50.38 -1.87 12.11 -74.74 228.49 0 5.30 -60.42 1.39 -61.29 0 -169.79 26.77 -49.26 23.59 -36.67
2017 201.89 0 0.07 -81.55 32.31 -5.30 80.31 -1.41 41.72 -1.40 0 -94.73 9.75 -22.89 3.08 -54.29 14.91 -63.09 0.62 -60.00
Two-Year Cumulative Net Negative Fear Connectedness Receivers and Transmitters
2000-2001 21.38 -6.38 29.29 -2.11 0.80 -30.57 56.35 -2.68 39.47 -9.98 0 -56.54 14.26 -7.72 33.44 -2.44 0 -44.45 0.82 -32.93
2002-2003 22.68 -57.00 76.79 -9.76 0 -104.75 65.26 -10.94 62.04 -12.52 13.11 -33.19 63.15 -3.95 41.80 -40.29 12.80 -46.66 10.75 -49.31
2004-2005 29.39 -34.89 70.29 -5.66 32.39 -22.17 15.99 -37.43 61.98 -4.67 18.96 -27.04 20.67 -34.72 19.45 -16.79 8.29 -48.19 9.55 -55.42
2006-2007 90.10 -10.74 62.46 -14.47 20.47 -36.34 33.07 -33.31 76.63 -2.33 13.57 -69.73 8.72 -61.42 12.56 -67.94 8.39 -46.06 35.92 -19.55
2008-2009 64.04 -32.71 11.19 -96.32 52.42 -72.00 18.16 -91.94 318.86 0 142.70 -9.48 13.00 -88.26 3.89 -108.00 32.25 -44.26 3.90 -117.45
2010-2011 343.59 0 9.12 -84.74 16.98 -81.53 24.49 -39.07 81.57 -32.29 39.97 -62.81 100.33 -16.22 36.62 -74.15 7.05 -104.04 0.64 -165.53
2012-2013 161.00 -9.66 45.34 -75.96 250.06 -2.93 94.18 -22.81 3.95 -118.01 5.01 -82.52 30.13 -28.16 3.15 -136.53 11.26 -110.19 22.64 -39.95
2014-2015 100.50 -70.41 40.52 -160.18 99.30 -49.73 246.96 -1.18 290.39 -9.92 60.64 -47.46 8.33 -83.89 2.03 -195.52 27.94 -125.79 0.02 -132.56
2016-2017 396.59 0 2.05 -172.22 82.70 -7.17 92.42 -76.16 270.21 -1.40 5.30 -155.15 11.15 -84.19 3.08 -224.08 41.68 -112.36 24.21 -96.68
Pre-, During-, Post-Crisis Cumulative Net Negative Fear Connectedness Receivers and Transmitters
Pre-Crisis 159.58 -102.11 225.35 -31.97 42.06 -193.81 170.68 -57.96 217.92 -29.52 34.37 -186.44 103.04 -98.19 107.27 -106.85 29.49 -171.36 44.25 -155.81
Crisis 46.22 -38.49 24.50 -70.61 381.86 -35.21 18.16 -101.58 248.87 0 99.02 -9.15 15.01 -84.63 3.89 -86.58 22.38 -45.87 15.97 -87.03
Post-Crisis 1024.36 -81.19 94.65 -531.58 448.44 -179.08 461.28 -155.96 738.17 -162.73 169.54 -346.06 151.25 -225.42 44.69 -673.11 97.84 -463.04 49.27 -461.32
Total Period Cumulative Net Negative Fear Connectedness Receivers and Transmitters
2000-2017 1230.17 -221.80 344.50 -634.17 554.53 -408.11 650.13 -315.19 1204.97 -192.25 302.94 -541.66 269.31 -407.92 155.87 -866.30 149.73 -680.09 109.50 -704.17
Notes: This table shows the cumulative net negative fear connectedness receivers and transmitters for the ten main U.S. financial institutions. The negative VIX NET directional measure is computed as the difference between negative VIX TO and negative VIX FROM.
When this difference is positive, the financial institution can be classified as a net negative fear connectedness transmitter (T), while, when negative, it can be classified as a net negative fear connectedness receiver (R). The ranking is reported for every year and every two
years, for the pre-crisis, during crisis and post-crisis periods, and for the total period. For every considered period, the main “fear” transmitters and the main “fear” receivers are highlighted in bold. Selected VAR lags = 4 and Forecast Horizon = 12. The rolling window
length is equal to 200 days. The selected period spans from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
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The cumulative main net positive connectedness transmitter for the pre-crisis period is found to be J.P. Morgan
Chase, with Goldman Sachs contributing almost the same amount. In the pre-crisis period, the main positive “fear”
receiver is Bank of New York Mellon, followed by Morgan Stanley. Interestingly, during the global financial crisis,
Wells Fargo is classified as a main positive “fear” transmitter, while Bank of New York Mellon is found to be a
positive “fear” receiver. For the post-financial crisis period, J.P. Morgan Chase is found to be the main positive
“fear” transmitter, followed by Citigroup, while PNC Bank is found to be the main positive “fear” receiver. The
total sample cumulative ranking shows, overall, that J.P. Morgan Chase is the main positive “fear” transmitter,
whereas Bank of New York Mellon is the main positive “fear” receiver within the U.S. banking system.
Table 7 shows the ranking for the net negative “fear” connectedness. The annual ranking highlights a main
contribution in the negative “fear” transmission from Goldman Sachs, followed by J.P. Morgan Chase and Wells
Fargo. American Express played the main role in terms of annual negative “fear” reception, followed by Morgan
Stanley. For the two-year ranking, we find, again, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo to be
the main negative “fear” transmitters and a clearer role for American Express and Bank of New York Mellon as
negative “fear” receivers. The pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods rankings indicate that Bank of America,
Wells Fargo and J.P. Morgan Chase had the main negative “fear” transmitter roles, respectively. Wells Fargo
is found to be the main negative “fear” receiver in the pre-crisis period, Citigroup during the financial crisis
and American Express in the post-crisis period. Over the total sample period, the negative cumulative “fear”
connectedness picture points to J.P. Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs as the main transmitters of negative “fear”
to the system and to American Express as the main financial institution receiving negative “fear” from the system.
Figures ?? and ?? in Appendix B complement the analysis and show which U.S. banks contribute more to the
positive and negative “fear” connectedness, respectively, over time.
5.4 Case Study: Goldman Sachs
Since Goldman Sachs has been identified as the main “fear” transmitter in the financial sector, we investigate this
bank more closely, reporting the dynamics of the connectedness in response to systematic and specific events.
We present the net directional “fear” connectedness indexes, together with the net AFC of the single financial
institution in order to determine their asymmetric behavior over the studied time period. In the Goldman Sachs
case, we denote the net positive “fear” as C+GS,NET and the net negative “fear” as C−GS,NET. Appendix C contains
similar case studies of other financial institutions that are found to be the top net aggregate “fear” transmitters
and receivers in our previous analysis. The same notation will apply for these banks, and major specific company
events, along with systematic events, will be reported for the selected time period.
Figure 5 captures the net positive and net negative “fear” connectedness and the net AFC for Goldman Sachs.
In January 2000, Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers were the lead managers for the first internet bond offering
for the World Bank, which is found to correspond to one of the highest levels of C+GS,NET received by Goldman
Sachs. When Goldman Sachs purchased Spear, Leeds and Kellogg in September 2000 for more than $6 billion,
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significant positive and negative “fear” was transmitted into the system. In 2003, Goldman Sachs took an almost
50% stake in a joint venture together with JBWere, which resulted in a spike of C+GS,NET transmitted, together
with an increase in absorbed C−GS,NET. We find C−GS,NET transmission during the financial crisis, especially in 2007,
when Goldman Sachs’ traders bet against the mortgage market, which gave an alarming pessimistic signal to the
U.S. financial sector. In October 2008, Goldman Sachs received a $10-billion preferred stock investment from the
Figure 5: Net Fear Connectedness and Net AFC - Goldman Sachs
Notes: The figure shows the net positive “fear” connectedness, C+GS,NET , and net negative “fear” connectedness, C−GS,NET for Goldman Sachs, together with the
AFC, computed as difference between the two. The figure also reports the main specific company events during the time period: [A] First Internet Bond Offering
[B] Spear, Leeds and Kellogg Acquisitions [C] Joint Venture with JBWere [D] Short-Selling of Subprime Mortgage-Backed Securities [E] $10 Billion Preferred
Stock from TARP [F] TARP Repayment [G] JBWere Full Control [H] Global Alpha Fund Shutdown [I] $17 Billion Bond Offering by Apple Inc. Selected VAR
lags = 4 and forecast horizon = 12.The rolling window length is equal to 200 days. The NBER recession periods are highlighted in grey. The selected period spans
from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
U.S. Treasury as part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). This bailout intervention appears to increase
the U.S. financial sector instability resulting in an increase in transmitted C−GS,NET. In June 2009, Goldman Sachs
repaid the U.S. TARP investment, resulting in a drop in the transmitted net C−GS,NET, while in an increase in the
received C+GS,NET as a sign of recovery. Later on, in 2011, Goldman Sachs took over JBWere, which contributed to
the reception of both net positive and net negative “fear” . One of the highest peaks of C+GS,NET received is found
in April 2013, when Goldman Sachs, together with Deutsche Bank, led a $17 billion bond offering by Apple Inc.,
one of the largest non-bank bond deals in history. During the same year, Goldman Sachs led Twitter’s IPO. Both
IPOs resulted in a stable C+GS,NET reception and a C−GS,NET transmission for Goldman Sachs from that time onwards.
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6 Predictive Power of Fear Connectedness Indexes
Motivated by the previous results, we test the predictive power of our asymmetric connectedness measures in
forecasting future macroeconomic conditions, as well as the potential increase in uncertainty. Our hypothesis
is that forward-looking connectedness measures may result in an early warning tool to forecast the declines in
the U.S. macroeconomic conditions or increases in financial and economic uncertainty. We select the following
monthly indicators, which reflect the macroeconomic and economic conditions, such as the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti
(ADS) Business Condition Index (Aruoba et al., 2009), the Chicago FED National Activity Index, CFNAI, the
Kansas City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI) (see Hakkio et al., 2009), the NBER recession period dummy variable
and the U.S. Industrial Production (IP) 9. As uncertainty proxies, we select the Economic Policy Uncertainty
(EPU) index (see Baker et al., 2016), the GeoPolitical Risk (GPR) index by Caldara and Iacoviello (2018), the
Economic Uncertainty Index (EUI) by Bali et al. (2014), the CBOE implied volatility index (VIX ) and the average
conditional volatility based on GARCH(1,1) of some U.S. macroeconomic variables (AVGVOL)10.
The first set of equations concerns the macroeconomic indicators (MacroInd), while the second regards the
uncertainty indicators (UncertInd). We control for the 1- to 12-month lags of endogenous variables.
MacroIndt+h = β0 + βCt +
11∑
k=0
γkMacroIndt−k + t (19)
MacroIndt+h = β0 + β
−C−t + β+C+t +
11∑
k=0
γkMacroIndt−k + t (20)
MacroIndt+h = β0 + β
C−t
C+t
+
11∑
k=0
γkMacroIndt−k + t, (21)
9They are collected according to their available sample, at a monthly frequency, from the following sources: the Aruoba-Diebold-
Scotti (ADS) Business Condition Index tracks real business conditions at a high frequency and it is based on economic indica-
tors. The information is collected from: https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/
business-conditions-index. The Chicago FED National Activity Index (CFNAI) is a monthly index that tracks the overall eco-
nomic activity and the inflationary pressure. It is computed as a weighted average of 85 monthly indicators and it is collected from:
https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/cfnai/index. The Kansas City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI) is a measure of
stress in the U.S. financial system and is based on eleven financial market variables (see Hakkio et al., 2009). It is collected from https://
www.kansascityfed.org/research/indicatorsdata/kcfsi. The NBER recession period dummy variable for the U.S. tracks
recession(1) and expansion (0) periods according to NBER and is available at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USREC.
The monthly growth rate of the U.S. Industrial Production (IP) measures the real output for all the facilities in the U.S. and is collected from
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/INDPRO.
10The EPU index by Baker et al. (2016) is computed from news associated with the ten most important American newspapers, reflecting the
concerns and uncertainty around specific economic or political events. It is collected from http://www.policyuncertainty.com/.
The GeoPolitical Risk index by Caldara and Iacoviello (2018) (GPR) is computed in a similar way to EPU from newspaper arti-
cles associated with geopolitical events, wars, terrorist attacks or international conflicts. It is available at https://www2.bc.edu/
matteo-iacoviello/gpr.htm. The Economic Uncertainty Index (EUI) by Bali et al. (2014) is a measure of economic uncertainty
based on the time-varying conditional volatility of macroeconomic and financial variables, such as the default spread, term spread, short-
term interest rate, dividend yield, equity market index, inflation, unemployment rate and GDP available at http://faculty.msb.edu/
tgb27/workingpapers.html. VIX is the CBOE implied volatility index, while AVGVOL is computed, in a similar way as in Allen et al.
(2012), as the average time-varying GARCH(1,1) conditional volatility of some macroeconomic variables common in the literature. In this pa-
per, we select the default spread as difference between the BAA-rated and AAA-rated corporate bonds (DEF), the term spread as the difference
between the 10-year T-bond and the three-month T-bill yield (TERM), the relative short-term interest rate, which is computed as a difference
between the three-month T-bill rate and its annual moving average (RREL), the industrial production monthly growth rate (IP) and the inflation
rate computed by the U.S. consumer price index (INF). All these variables are collected from https://fred.stlouisfed.org/.
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UncertIndt+h = β0 + βCt +
11∑
k=0
γkUncertIndt−k + t, (22)
UncertIndt+h = β0 + β
−C−t + β+C+t +
11∑
k=0
γkUncertIndt−k + t, (23)
UncertIndt+h = β0 + β
C−t
C+t
+
11∑
k=0
γkUncertIndt−k + t, (24)
where MacroInd ∈ {ADS,CFNAI,KCSFI,NBER, IP} is one of the macroeconomic indicator variables, and
UncertInd ∈ {EPU,GPR,EUI,VIX,AVGVOL} is one of the uncertainty proxies for h = 1, ..., 12 horizons
up to one year. For the NBER recession dichotomous variable, a probit regression is fitted and the z-statistics are
reported in parentheses, while for the other variables, least squares regressions are estimated and Newey t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. Equations 19 and 22 concern the aggregate Ct index, whereas 20 and 23 the positive
and negative connectedness indexes, C+t and C−t . Equations 21 and 24 concern the ratio between C−t and C+t .
Every connectedness index in this exercise is computed as quarterly, end-of-the-quarter, index from forecast error
variance decomposition, as in formula (10), by aggregating three months of implied volatility observations (60
trading days) with regards to the indexes, VIX , VIX− and VIX+ , for every financial institutions The quarterly
connectedness measures are rolled every month in order to produce monthly Ct, C+t and C−t observations that
reflect the previous quarter. The monthly macroeconomic and uncertainty indicators are taken as the average of
the previous quarter, and recession is marked binary as 1 when the average gives values > 0.5 and 0 when the
average gives values < 0.5. This process allows us to match the information of the fear connectedness indexes
with the macro and uncertainty indicators, thus creating monthly observations that reflect the information in the
previous quarter.
6.1 Predicting Macroeconomic Conditions and Uncertainty
Tables 8 and 9 display the results for the predictive power of the fear connectedness indexes for the future macroe-
conomic conditions and uncertainty indicators, respectively. Table 8 reports the results of the predicting regres-
sions estimated through equations (19) and (20). First, β refers to the effect of the total fear connectedness Ct
on the selected macroeconomic indicators. Second, β−, and β+ break the effect into negative and positive parts,
respectively. Our main hypothesis is that decomposed connectedness measures C−t and C+t carry additional pre-
dictive information compared to the aggregate Ct.
One of the first observations made from Table 8 is that C−t and C+t are able to predict the ADS Business
condition index from 4 to 12 months and from 4 to 10 months in advance, respectively. Negative and positive in-
formation further predicts CFNAI from 3 to 10 months in advance and from 3 to 9 months in advance, respectively.
In addition, C−t can signal a recession early, providing an alarm a few months before the aggregate Ct, emphasizing
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the importance of investors’ expectations contained in the put options. C−t is also found to be the only connect-
edness index that can predict short-mid future levels of KCSFI. In contrast to the decomposed connectedness, the
aggregate connectedness Ct is unable to predict the ADS Business condition index, the CFNAI, the KCSFI and
the industrial production, while showing only a long horizon predictability power for future recessions.
Table 9 shows the results of the predictive regressions estimated through equations (22) and (23). Both Ct
and C+t contain predictive information for the EPU index, from 4 to 6 months ahead and from 3 to 5 months
ahead, respectively. C−t has predictive information for the EPU index, one year ahead. Future geopolitical risk
is predicted by all the three Ct indexes, but at different horizons. Ct forecasts well the future level of AVGVOL
up to one year, while C−t from 8 to 12 months ahead, respectively. The Ct measure is unable to predict only
future economic uncertainty (EUI) and future levels of the VIX index. The latter is only predicted by a mixture of
information from C+t and, especially, C−t . C−t is the only measure with predictive power on EUI.
Our results are comparable to findings of Allen et al. (2012), who introduced a Catastrophic Risk in the
Financial Sector (CATFIN) measure and found that it is able to predict future macroeconomic conditions.11 We
include a CATFIN measure in all regressions as a control variable. We find that the results are robust and do
not materially change the significance of connectedness measures. This finding leads us to the conclusion that
information contained in connectedness indexes carries additional information to CATFIN. Different information
content can also be seen from the low correlation of the CATFIN and connectedness indexes12.
Overall, we find that in contrast to aggregate connectedness, decomposed indexes carry predictive information
for the macroeconomic indicators. This finding is in line with recent literature on the decomposed variance
risk premium (e.g. Kilic and Shaliastovich, 2018) assessing how the mixture of information coming from the
decomposed premia is more helpful to predict, in their case, future asset returns. We have conducted several
robustness checks on the predictive exercise as well; however, our results appear to be robust13.
We perform the same predictive exercise for both the macroeconomic and the uncertainty indicators by group-
ing the information contained in C−t and C+t as a ratio between the two to check whether we can still obtain the
same predictability results with a more compact and parsimonious equation. Results for this exercise are reported
in Table 10. We can observe that the C−t /C+t ratio can predict macroeconomic activity for long horizons.
11Catastrophic Risk in the Financial Sector (CATFIN) measure by Allen et al. (2012) is constructed using nonparametric and parametric
approaches based on value-at-risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES) methods. The parametric distributions used to estimate the 99% VaR and
the 1% ES are the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) and the skewed generalized error distribution (SGED). The nonparametric methods
are measured as a cut-off point of the left tail minus one percentile of the monthly excess returns for the VaR and as an average of the extreme
financial firms returns beyond the 1% nonparametric VaR. CATFIN is then constructed as an average of the three VaR and ES measures.
12The complete set of results on this predictive exercise when we control for CATFIN is available from the authors upon request.
13We have also changed the construction methodology for the connectedness indexes. We have performed the same predictive exercise by
considering Ct indexes as computed in sections 4.2 and 5.2, considering a dynamic framework with a rolling window length equal to 200 days.
The results are similar to those presented here, with C−t and C+t still playing a major role compared to the total Ct. We have replaced the
200-day window length with 100 days finding that the results still hold; however, they shift a few months. In order to avoid this information
mismatch due to the rolling window length, we decided to compute quarterly static Ct for every quarter and linearly interpolate them in
order to obtain monthly measures that match the selected macro and uncertainty indicators. The results were still robust with, in some cases,
predictability power spanning from the very short-horizon until month 10. The same major roles for C−t and C+t are found compared with Ct,
remaining robust to all the exercises we have tried. However, we decided to discard this methodology due to the interpolation approximation
and to present results regarding our Ct indexes computed quarterly, end-of-the-month, and rolled for every month. We also controlled for
CATFIN in all these other cases, finding that results remain robust and provide additional information. This finding is also confirmed by
the fact that, with regard to the 200-day rolling window, for instance, we find that CATFIN is positively but weakly correlated with our
connectedness measures, namely, 0.05, 0.24 and 0.23, for Ct, C+t and C−t , respectively. All these additional empirical results are available
from the authors upon request.
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Table 8: Ct, C−t and C+t Macroeconomic Activity Prediction
Forecast ADS t-stat R2 CFNAI t-stat R2 KCSFI t-stat R2 NBER t-stat R2 IP t-stat R2
1 β -0.007 (-0.376) 0.981 -0.003 (-0.090) 0.948 -0.001 (-0.991) 0.987 -0.073 (-0.986) 0.776 0.001 (0.292) 0.994
β− 0.003 (0.123) 0.981 0.001 (0.342) 0.942 -0.010 (-2.085) 0.988 -0.558 (-0.654) 0.774 0.005 (0.859) 0.995
β+ -0.001 (-0.602) -0.001 (-0.399) 0.004 (1.600) -0.006 (-0.088) -0.003 (-0.772)
2 β -0.007 (-0.133) 0.889 0.001 (0.061) 0.868 -0.001 (-0.402) 0.940 -0.048 (-0.821) 0.616 0.004 (0.324) 0.991
β− 0.005 (0.802) 0.890 0.010 (1.231) 0.869 -0.021 (-1.696) 0.943 -0.050 (-0.783) 0.617 0.019 (1.294) 0.991
β+ -0.005 (-1.163) -0.006 (-1.137) 0.010 (1.456) 0.006 (0.111) -0.013 (-1.361)
3 β 0.000 (0.027) 0.731 0.002 (0.234) 0.723 0.000 (0.080) 0.849 -0.039 (-0.767) 0.487 0.013 (0.561) 0.975
β− 0.017 (1.629) 0.738 0.025 (2.103) 0.732 -0.033 (-1.581) 0.857 -0.016 (-1.694) 0.505 0.041 (1.695) 0.975
β+ -0.011 (-1.648) -0.013 (-1.667) 0.015 (1.381) 0.043 (0.832) -0.026 (-1.675)
4 β 0.000 (0.021) 0.592 -0.002 (-0.244) 0.637 0.001 (0.168) 0.754 -0.002 (-0.722) 0.420 0.013 (0.412) 0.955
β− 0.033 (2.376) 0.613 0.041 (2.562) 0.662 -0.037 (-1.525) 0.763 -0.012 (-2.111) 0.410 0.070 (2.219) 0.958
β+ -0.019 (-2.043) -0.024 (-2.372) 0.017 (1.330) 0.071 (1.460) -0.050 (-2.524)
5 β -0.000 (-0.060) 0.492 -0.001 (-0.088) 0.518 0.001 (0.142) 0.660 -0.004 (-0.954) 0.315 0.011 (0.287) 0.931
β− 0.045 (2.682) 0.531 0.047 (2.502) 0.551 -0.041 (-1.670) 0.671 -0.079 (-1.586) 0.304 0.095 (2.470) 0.935
β+ -0.026 (-2.295) -0.025 (-2.142) 0.017 (1.342) 0.062 (1.410) -0.071 (-2.812)
6 β 0.002 (0.211) 0.392 0.001 (0.012) 0.415 -0.000 (-0.040) 0.561 -0.005 (-0.890) 0.224 0.014 (0.310) 0.898
β− 0.054 (2.712) 0.446 0.054 (2.471) 0.458 -0.042 (-1.727) 0.573 -0.116 (-2.309) 0.244 0.128 (2.621) 0.905
β+ -0.031 (-2.390) -0.031 (-2.306) 0.015 (0.118) 0.066 (1.525) -0.095 (-3.017)
7 β 0.007 (0.621) 0.299 0.003 (0.256) 0.312 -0.002 (-0.138) 0.468 -0.055 (-1.377) 0.151 0.024 (0.436) 0.855
β− 0.057 (2.714) 0.358 0.053 (2.547) 0.353 -0.043 (-1.687) 0.481 -0.130 (-2.630) 0.191 0.160 (2.732) 0.865
β+ -0.033 (-2.321) -0.029 (-2.202) 0.014 (0.919) 0.067 (1.588) -0.109 (-2.902)
8 β 0.011 (0.899) 0.218 0.002 (0.191) 0.247 -0.007 (-0.414) 0.381 -0.072 (-1.847) 0.107 0.038 (0.608) 0.805
β− 0.056 (2.840) 0.273 0.056 (2.764) 0.293 -0.043 (-1.583) 0.393 -0.017 (-2.337) 0.112 0.197 (2.983) 0.820
β+ -0.031 (-2.176) -0.034 (-2.412) 0.012 (0.690) 0.005 (0.829) -0.124 (-2.828)
9 β 0.009 (0.697) 0.154 0.006 (0.047) 0.193 -0.014 (-0.685) 0.314 -0.078 (-2.030) 0.089 0.046 (0.647) 0.747
β− 0.053 (2.976) 0.205 0.049 (2.684) 0.229 -0.039 (-1.507) 0.323 -0.023 (-2.913) 0.109 0.222 (3.051) 0.767
β+ -0.028 (-2.010) -0.029 (-1.999) 0.010 (0.502) 0.005 (0.888) -0.133 (-2.663)
10 β 0.005 (0.375) 0.109 0.001 (0.074) 0.145 -0.017 (-0.756) 0.263 -0.057 (-1.519) 0.058 0.053 (0.686) 0.685
β− 0.048 (2.826) 0.151 0.043 (2.311) 0.175 -0.037 (-1.525) 0.270 -0.134 (-3.005) 0.110 0.241 (3.033) 0.708
β+ -0.027 (-1.737) -0.026 (-1.535) 0.008 (0.423) 0.051 (1.322) -0.145 (-2.534)
11 β 0.001 (0.110) 0.076 -0.001 (-0.068) 0.104 -0.016 (-0.691) 0.226 -0.057 (-1.533) 0.042 0.052 (0.631) 0.620
β− 0.041 (2.322) 0.107 0.033 (1.958) 0.121 -0.035 (-1.506) 0.233 -0.113 (-2.696) 0.079 0.241 (3.033) 0.708
β+ -0.026 (-1.523) -0.022 (-1.238) 0.012 (0.541) 0.038 (0.998) -0.145 (-2.534)
12 β -0.000 (-0.023) 0.054 -0.003 (-0.192) 0.070 -0.018 (-0.747) 0.196 -0.052 (-1.402) 0.030 0.048 (0.549) 0.556
β− 0.034 (1.921) 0.076 0.035 (1.888) 0.091 -0.032 (-1.385) 0.200 -0.094 (-2.287) 0.054 0.266 (3.109) 0.582
β+ -0.025 (-1.372) -0.027 (-1.381) 0.015 (0.612) 0.029 (0.773) -0.164 (-2.351)
Notes: This table presents the results of the predictive regressions estimated through equation 19 and 20 between the total Ct and the decomposed C−t and C+t , respectively and some macroeconomic
conditions indicators such as the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index (ADS), the Chicago FED National Activity Index (CFNAI), the Kansas City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI), the NBER
recession dummy variable (NBER) and the Industrial Production Index (IP). For NBER, a Probit regression is estimated, and the z-statistics are reported in parentheses, while for the other variables, OLS
regressions are estimated, and Newey (1987) t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Significant relationships are highlighted in bold. All the connectedness indexes are computed quarterly and rolled every
month, matching the monthly variables we want to predict for the sample from 10-2000 to 12-2017.
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Table 9: Ct, C−t and C+t Uncertainty Index Prediction
Forecast EPU t-stat R2 GPR t-stat R2 EUI t-stat R2 VIX t-stat R2 AVGVOL t-stat R2
1 β 0.231 (1.281) 0.954 0.436 (0.618) 0.630 -0.007 (-0.222) 0.995 -0.012 (-0.456) 0.960 -0.005 (-0.904) 0.985
β− -0.189 (-1.327) 0.953 -1.491 (-1.311) 0.635 -0.002 (-0.843) 0.995 -0.134 (-2.947) 0.963 -0.005 (-0.654) 0.986
β+ 0.139 (1.032) 1.162 (0.845) -0.000 (-0.402) 0.060 (2.124) -0.003 (-0.443)
2 β 0.553 (1.506) 0.842 1.701 (1.793) 0.308 0.000 (0.010) 0.976 0.006 (0.102) 0.834 -0.002 (-2.055) 0.926
β− -0.237 (-0.716) 0.842 -1.577 (-1.113) 0.312 -0.006 (-1.327) 0.976 -0.279 (-3.714) 0.846 -0.009 (-0.409) 0.926
β+ 0.461 (1.627) 1.796 (1.061) -0.002 (-0.551) 0.132 (1.940) -0.002 (-1.236)
3 β 0.857 (1.603) 0.684 2.506 (1.706) 0.211 -0.004 (-0.414) 0.931 -0.046 (0.441) 0.626 -0.006 (-2.662) 0.802
β− -0.216 (-0.426) 0.686 -0.490 (-0.032) 0.207 -0.018 (-2.057) 0.932 -0.428 (-1.955) 0.652 -0.002 (-0.430) 0.804
β+ 0.875 (2.172) 1.466 (1.052) -0.006 (-0.748) 0.181 (1.528) -0.004 (-1.402)
4 β 1.037 (1.739) 0.618 2.818 (1.368) 0.190 -0.010 (-0.727) 0.882 0.095 (0.729) 0.490 -0.010 (-3.282) 0.684
β− -0.024 (-0.041) 0.625 -0.552 (-0.378) 0.190 -0.036 (-1.939) 0.885 -0.454 (-1.684) 0.519 -0.005 (-0.685) 0.684
β+ 1.134 (2.582) 2.444 (1.937) -0.007 (-0.594) 0.175 (1.225) -0.004 (-1.121)
5 β 1.047 (1.686) 0.581 2.989 (1.453) 0.180 -0.019 (-1.033) 0.827 0.103 (0.726) 0.403 -0.013 (-3.530) 0.589
β− 0.030 (0.046) 0.590 -1.048 (-0.848) 0.175 -0.060 (-1.731) 0.835 -0.521 (-1.863) 0.440 -0.008 (-0.989) 0.587
β+ 1.193 (2.614) 2.135 (1.904) -0.004 (-0.250) 0.186 (1.316) -0.003 (-0.645)
6 β 0.857 (1.310) 0.545 2.423 (1.379) 0.148 -0.020 (-0.951) 0.773 0.100 (0.634) 0.333 -0.016 (-3.682) 0.522
β− -0.143 (-0.181) 0.548 -1.516 (-1.245) 0.144 -0.083 (-1.656) 0.785 -0.540 (-1.941) 0.374 -0.011 (-1.287) 0.513
β+ 0.900 (1.660) 1.458 (1.238) 0.006 (0.283) 0.206 (1.477) -0.002 (-0.369)
7 β 0.490 (0.680) 0.505 1.506 (0.958) 0.139 -0.016 (-0.681) 0.713 0.069 (0.399) 0.270 -0.017 (-3.372) 0.465
β− -0.324 (-0.367) 0.506 -2.461 (-1.795) 0.149 -0.094 (-1.569) 0.731 -0.551 (-1.933) 0.322 -0.011 (-1.485) 0.449
β+ 0.560 (0.813) 0.054 (0.048) 0.018 (0.273) 0.200 (1.363) -0.001 (-0.318)
8 β 0.241 (0.298) 0.485 2.107 (1.610) 0.188 -0.010 (-0.417) 0.661 0.030 (0.176) 0.246 -0.018 (-3.104) 0.411
β− -0.397 (-0.468) 0.486 -3.044 (-1.794) 0.199 -0.103 (-1.602) 0.677 -0.476 (-1.619) 0.280 -0.011 (-1.712) 0.390
β+ 0.281 (0.365) 0.936 (0.820 0.030 (0.983) 0.142 (0.885) -0.001 (-0.341)
9 β 0.206 (0.233) 0.480 2.584 (2.075) 0.218 -0.005 (-0.190) 0.600 -0.054 (-0.320) 0.229 -0.019 (-3.046) 0.361
β− -0.476 (-0.629) 0.483 -2.822 (-1.410) 0.222 -0.103 (-1.577) 0.616 -0.427 (-1.459) 0.258 -0.115 (-1.882) 0.335
β+ 0.483 (0.621) 1.568 (1.203) 0.037 (1.119) 0.050 (0.282) -0.001 (-0.340)
10 β 0.374 (0.408) 0.478 3.130 (2.181) 0.233 -0.005 (-0.155) 0.536 -0.088 (-0.505) 0.215 -0.021 (-3.356) 0.323
β− -0.706 (-1.024) 0.483 -2.867 (-1.569) 0.245 -0.109 (-1.660) 0.554 -0.346 (-1.344) 0.237 -0.012 (-2.042) 0.289
β+ 0.704 (0.986) 3.273 (2.126) 0.040 (1.130) 0.027 (0.014) -0.000 (-0.116)
11 β 0.506 (0.538) 0.467 2.968 (1.912) 0.236 -0.010 (-0.295) 0.468 -0.054 (-0.300) 0.202 -0.022 (-3.730) 0.300
β− -1.070 (-1.542) 0.477 -1.529 (-1.000) 0.226 -0.116 (-1.738) 0.488 -0.345 (-1.565) 0.223 -0.012 (1.981) 0.253
β+ 0.967 (1.386) 1.392 (1.145) 0.046 (1.130) 0.003 (0.020) -0.005 (-0.904)
12 β 0.526 (0.580) 0.442 1.536 (1.030) 0.228 -0.022 (-0.550) 0.403 -0.028 (-0.155) 0.195 -0.023 (-3.911) 0.285
β− -1.143 (-1.722) 0.375 -0.014 (-0.011) 0.224 -0.121 (-1.810) 0.424 -0.346 (-1.789) 0.214 -0.011 (-1.915) 0.230
β+ 1.037 (1.415) 0.401 (1.280) 0.043 (0.970) 0.045 (0.245) -0.001 (-0.201)
Notes: This table presents the results of the predictive regressions estimated through equation 22 for the total Ct and 23 for the C−t and C+t and some uncertainty proxies, such as the Economic and Policy Uncertainty
(EPU), the GeoPolitical Risk Index (GPR), the Economic Uncertainty Index (EUI), the CBOE VIX index and the macroeconomic conditional volatility average (AVGVOL). OLS regressions are estimated, and Newey
(1987) t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Significant relationships are highlighted in bold. All the connectedness indexes are computed quarterly and rolled every month, matching the monthly variables we want to
predict for the sample from 10-2000 to 12-2017.
27
Table 10: C−t /C+t Ratio, Macroeconomic Activity Prediction and Uncertainty Index Prediction
Panel A
Forecast ADS t-stat R2 CFNAI t-stat R2 KCSFI t-stat R2 NBER t-stat R2 IP t-stat R2
1 0.054 (0.345) 0.981 0.113 (0.413) 0.948 -0.550 (-1.890) 0.976 -1.652 (-0.312) 0.770 0.342 (0.849) 0.993
2 0.415 (1.018) 0.890 0.634 (1.349) 0.869 -1.189 (-1.714) 0.942 -2.229 (-0.537) 0.614 1.286 (1.411) 0.990
3 1.138 (1.783) 0.737 1.497 (2.230) 0.730 -1.844 (-1.517) 0.854 -5.729 (-1.433) 0.498 2.622 (1.859) 0.974
4 2.026 (2.462) 0.609 2.545 (2.782) 0.658 -2.055 (-1.476) 0.760 -7.748 (-2.032) 0.406 4.781 (2.614) 0.951
5 2.773 (2.734) 0.524 2.835 (2.610) 0.544 -2.183 (-1.591) 0.667 -5.992 (-1.752) 0.305 6.606 (2.941) 0.935
6 3.292 (2.733) 0.437 3.278 (2.580) 0.450 -2.129 (-1.540) 0.568 -7.272 (-2.174) 0.239 8.834 (3.117) 0.901
7 3.470 (2.645) 0.348 3.148 (2.586) 0.345 -2.135 (-1.421) 0.475 -7.814 (-2.395) 0.181 10.580 (3.132) 0.865
8 3.342 (2.587) 0.261 3.464 (2.700) 0.287 -2.043 (-1.226) 0.387 -4.925 (-1.734) 0.106 12.533 (3.223) 0.818
9 3.142 (2.528) 0.193 3.064 (2.428) 0.224 -1.808 (-1.075) 0.316 -6.208 (-2.159) 0.095 13.835 (3.150) 0.763
10 2.874 (2.273) 0.143 2.652 (1.949) 0.171 -1.678 (-1.019) 0.256 -7.135 (-2.493) 0.088 14.965 (3.018) 0.705
11 2.602 (1.918) 0.103 2.194 (1.849) 0.119 -1.799 (-1.045) 0.230 -5.918 (-2.160) 0.060 16.158 (2.972) 0.643
12 2.357 (1.674) 0.095 2.530 (1.728) 0.091 -1.850 (-1.014) 0.199 -4.843 (-1.794) 0.039 16.670 (2.932) 0.581
Panel B
Forecast EPU t-stat R2 GPR t-stat R2 EUI t-stat R2 VIX t-stat R2 AVGVOL t-stat R2
1 -13.199 (-1.443) 0.953 -104.147 (-1.061) 0.634 -0.027 (-0.154) 0.993 -7.361 (-2.782) 0.962 -0.005 (-0.086) 0.985
2 -20.923 (-1.519) 0.842 -140.320 (-1.197) 0.388 -0.096 (-0.277) 0.976 -15.458 (-2.151) 0.843 0.071 (0.459) 0.925
3 -50.795 (-1.763) 0.683 -75.554 (-0.716) 0.203 -0.325 (-0.546) 0.931 -22.627 (-1.802) 0.643 0.137 (0.467) 0.798
4 -56.843 (-1.793) 0.616 -135.436 (-1.394) 0.184 -0.929 (-0.891) 0.882 -23.408 (-1.723) 0.508 0.081 (0.186) 0.670
5 -58.481 (-1.644) 0.579 -141.518 (-1.692) 0.173 -1.829 (-0.998) 0.828 -26.184 (-1.687) 0.425 -0.101 (-0.191) 0.566
6 -51.201 (-1.101) 0.544 -124.551 (-1.661) 0.145 -3.062 (-1.147) 0.776 -27.856 (-1.852) 0.359 -0.239 (-0.443) 0.488
7 -41.017 (-0.714) 0.506 -89.873 (-1.247) 0.138 -3.967 (-1.233) 0.722 -28.002 (-1.821) 0.306 -0.265 (-0.547) 0.425
8 -30.035 (-0.495) 0.487 -151.071 (-1.662) 0.191 -4.859 (-1.385) 0.669 -22.751 (-1.398) 0.265 -0.261 (-0.598) 0.366
9 -41.205 (-0.720) 0.483 -171.151 (-1.486) 0.219 -5.225 (-1.446) 0.610 -16.777 (-0.995) 0.238 -0.270 (-0.633) 0.312
10 -57.875 (-1.141) 0.483 -249.011 (-2.002) 0.236 -5.593 (-1.510) 0.547 -10.327 (-0.627) 0.217 -0.353 (-0.817) 0.266
11 -81.023 (-1.637) 0.477 -119.608 (-1.229) 0.226 -6.112 (-1.551) 0.481 -11.443 (-0.743) 0.207 -0.349 (-0.792) 0.232
12 -86.748 (-1.643) 0.453 -19.397 (-0.247) 0.223 -6.173 (-1.508) 0.415 -13.654 (-0.980) 0.202 -0.285 (-0.683) 0.210
Notes: Panel A presents the results of the predictive regressions estimated through equation 21 between C−t /C+t and some macroeconomic conditions indicators ,such as the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti
Business Conditions Index (ADS), the Chicago FED National Activity Index (CFNAI), the Kansas City Financial Stress Index (KCFSI), the NBER recession dummy variable (NBER) and the Industrial
Production Index (IP). Panel B presents the results of the predictive regressions estimated through equation 24 between C−t /C+t and some uncertainty proxies such as the Economic and Policy Uncertainty
(EPU), the GeoPolitical Risk Index (GPR), the Economic Uncertainty Index (EUI), the CBOE VIX index and the macroeconomic conditional volatility average (AVGVOL). For NBER, a Probit regression
is estimated and the z-statistics are reported in parentheses, while for the other variables, OLS regressions are estimated and Newey (1987) t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Significant relationships
are highlighted in bold. All the connectedness indexes are computed quarterly and rolled every month, matching the monthly variables we want to predict for the sample from 10-2000 to 12-2017.
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For instance, the C−t and C+t ratio can predict the ADS Index, from 3 to 12 months in advance, the CFNAI
from 3 to 12 months in advance, the NBER recession period from 4 to 12 months in advance and the IP growth
rate from 3 up to 12 months in advance. The ratio is found to have short-term predictive power in relation to
KCSFI, instead carrying predictive information for only one and two months. From Table 10, we infer that the
C−t /C+t ratio cannot predict the EUI and AVGVOL, while it can predict the EPU index and the GPR index 3-4
and from 5 to 10 months ahead, respectively. The ratio predicts VIX up to 7 months. Results for the C−t and C+t
ratio show that, in some cases, such as for EUI and AVGVOL, the ratio shows no predictive power. Thus, it can
be concluded that when information contained in C−t and C+t are kept separate and added to the same regression
equation, they are better able to predict future levels of economic activity and, particularly, of uncertainty proxies.
7 Conclusion
Asymmetric implied volatility connectedness measures were constructed in this paper to study the transmission
of different information on “fears” extracted from the two sides of the stock options market in the U.S. financial
sector, as represented by the ten main financial institutions in the U.S. The decomposed connectedness measures
computed from these financial institutions’ VIX indexes provided forward-looking valuable information reflecting
future investors’ expectations.
The decomposed C−t and C+t measures are found to play an important and timely role in signaling changes in
future macroeconomic activity or uncertainty indicators. Thus, they can be considered forward-looking warning
tools that will complement the already-existing toolbox of systemic risk measures. Our empirical analysis points
out that the information extracted from C−t and C+t serves as a better and more timely predictive tool than the
aggregate Ct, especially for macroeconomic downturns and activity measured by ADS, CFNAI and industrial
production. Moreover, C−t is also found to be a early signaling tool with regard to recessions, VIX and EUI since
changes in these factors are found to be reflected more strongly in the U.S. put options market.
We highlighted how financial institutions play different roles as positive/negative “fear” transmitters/receivers.
From a systemic risk point of view, our new methodology provides a richer and more detailed picture of bank
networks. For instance, we identify banks that are predominantly receivers of “fear” , as well banks transmitting
“fear” in the financial system, and we identify the role played over time by a top bank like Goldman Sachs. This
exercise exacerbates even further the precious role that separate “fear” connectedness indexes play in offering
separate information when employed to predict future levels of macroeconomic activity or uncertainty indicators.
Having an ex ante monitoring tool for systemic risk might be particularly useful for financial stability and
market supervision. There is significant predictive information in the implied positive and negative connectedness
indexes related to future macroeconomic activity or uncertainty. Moreover, being able to identify the more sys-
temically important financial institutions can be helpful for preventing the spread of volatility and risk within the
system, preparing the financial institutions and policymakers to implement prudent operations in advance.
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Appendix A Positive and Negative Implied Volatilities
The time dynamics of implied volatility series is illustrated in Figure A1. Overall, all the ten financial institutions’
volatility indexes spike in alignment with the global financial crisis, which is found to be a common denominator
of uncertainty and volatility increases. There are also more idiosyncratic jumps in volatility indexes. For instance,
J.P. Morgan Chase VIX indexes are found to spike in 2000, when Chase Manhattan Corp. merged with J.P. Morgan
& Co., becoming J.P. Morgan Chase, and to increase the company’s volatility until late 2001, when the deal was
finalized. The main volatility peak for Bank of America is found during the financial crisis due to its acquisition
of Merrill Lynch in September 2008. In October 2000, Wells Fargo bought First Security Corp., becoming one
of the largest banks in the West, leading to an increase in the WFC’s implied volatility index. In mid 2001,
Citigroup acquired European American Bank and Banamex, resulting in an increase in Citi’s volatility indexes,
which spiked again in March 2012, when the Federal Reserve reported that Citigroup was one of the few main
banks that failed the stress tests. U.S. Bancorp began the 2000 era with a high level of volatility caused by the
acquisitions of Peninsula Bank in September 1999, with price renegotiations until January 2000. We observe how
companies’ idiosyncratic news, such as M&A deals, restructuring and negotiations contribute to their changes in
implied volatility. The latter, however, is found to react to macro events as well, such as the dot-com bubble burst,
the Enron scandal, the 9/11 terrorist attack, the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. A
mixture of idiosyncratic and systemic events is found to affect the financial stock implied volatility through the
options market.
Figure A1: Positive and Negative Implied Volatilities of the U.S. Financial Sector
Notes: The figure shows the single stock VIX and the decomposed volatility indexes VIX+ and VIX− for the ten main U.S. financial institutions. The NBER
recession periods are highlighted in grey. The selected period spans from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
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Appendix B Fear Net Directional Connectedness
Figure A2: Net Fear Connectedness
Notes: This figure shows the aggregate net “fear” connectedness for the ten main financial institutions. The NET directional connectedness is computed as the
difference between the TO and the FROM. Selected VAR lags = 4 and forecast horizon = 12. The rolling window length is equal to 200 days. The selected period
spans from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
Figure A3: Positive Net Fear Connectedness
Notes: This figure shows the positive net “fear” connectedness for the ten main financial institutions. The NET positive directional connectedness is computed as
difference between the positive TO and the positive FROM. Selected VAR lags = 4 and forecast horizon = 12. The rolling window length is equal to 200 days. The
selected period spans from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
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Figure A4: Negative Net Fear Connectedness
Notes: This figure shows the negative net “fear” connectedness for the ten main financial institutions. The NET negative directional connectedness is computed as
difference between the negative TO and the negative FROM. Selected VAR lags = 4 and forecast horizon = 12. The rolling window length is equal to 200 days. The
selected period spans from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
Appendix C Additional Analysis of Individual Financial Firm Net Fear
Connectedness
Figure A5 displays the net “fear” connectedness and the net AFC for J.P. Morgan Chase. In September 2000, the
merger between J.P.Morgan & Co. and Chase Manhattan combined two of the largest banks in New York City
into J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., resulting in a huge spike of transmitted C+JPM,NET and optimistic reactions among
American investors. Another peak in C+JPM,NET transmission is found in 2004, when J.P. Morgan Chase $ Co.
merged with Bank One, enlarging its presence across the U.S.
In April 2006, J.P.Morgan Chase acquired Bank of New York Mellon’s retail banking and regional middle-
market businesses, then exited from the retail banking, which resulted in both a transmission of negative and a
reception of positive CJPM,NET. In 2008, due to the deteriorating market conditions and capitalization of Bear
Stearns & Co. Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase acquired the bank for only $ 236 million. However, related to this event,
we find both positive and negative CJPM,NET transmission in the system, meaning investors had different views
on this acquisition. A few months later, in September 2008, J.P. Morgan Chase took over Washington Mutual,
an event that transmitted mainly C+JPM,NET in the financial sector. The spike C+JPM,NET transmission at the end of
2009 may be due to the announcement by J.P. Morgan Chase that it would buy the rest of Cazenove Group for 1
billion pounds. In November 2013, J.P. Morgan Chase received negative “fear” from the system when the Justice
Department announced that J.P. Morgan Chase had to pay $ 13 billion to settle investigations over mortgage-
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Figure A5: Net Fear Connectedness and AFC - J.P. Morgan Chase
Notes: The figure shows the net positive “fear” connectedness, C+JPM,NET , and net negative “fear” connectedness, C−JPM,NET for J.P. Morgan Chase, together with
the AFC, computed as difference between the two. The figure reports also the main specific company events along the time period: [A] J.P. Morgan & Co. Merges
with Chase Manhattan [B] Merge with Bank One [C] Bank of New York Mellon’ Retail Banking Acquisition. [D] Acquisition of Bear Stearns [E] Washington
Mutual Takeover [F] Cazenove Group Acquisition Announcement [G] Settlement of Investigations over Mortgage-Backed Securities [H] Commodities Division
Sale [I] Legal and Fraudulent News. Selected VAR lags = 4 and forecast horizon = 12. The rolling window length is equal to 200 days. The NBER recession
periods are highlighted in grey. The selected period spans from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
backed securities. One year later, J.P. Morgan sold its commodities division to Mercuria for a quarter of its initial
valuation, which resulted in a C−JPM,NET reception. In 2017, J.P. Morgan Chase was found to transmit C−JPM,NET in
the financial sector due to news in relation to former employee frauds, a former COO’s resignation and a lawsuit
filed by the Nigerian government with regard to money transfers to a former corrupt minister.
In Figure A6, with regard to Bank of America, we observe that the net positive “fear” , C+BAC,NET, is transmitted
to the system when Bank of America agreed to acquire FleetBoston Financial for $47 billion at the end of 2003
and when the merger between Bank of America and the credit card giant, MBNA, for $35 billion was announced
in July 2005 and then finalized in January 2006. Furthermore, in May 2006, Bank of America and the Brazilian
Banco Ita entered into a merger agreement. In November 2006, Bank of America announced the purchase of
The United States Trust Company from the Charles Schwab Corporation for $3.3 billion, which resulted in a
C−BAC,NET, transmission together with a C+BAC,NET reception. The agreement in September 2007 to buy LaSalle
Bank Corporation from ABN AMRO for $21 billion increased the level of C+BAC,NET received from Bank of
America, while different “fear” connectedness is found for two other acquisitions by Bank of America in the midst
of the global financial crisis. For instance, in January 2008, Bank of America agreed to a $4 billion acquisition
of Countrywide Financial, which resulted in a C−BAC,NET reception14. We find an even higher level of C−BAC,NET
received by Bank of America in correspondence to the announcement of the acquisition of Merrill Lynch &
14The acquisition was completed in July 2008, despite the fact that in March 2008, Countrywide was investigated for fraud and the acquisi-
tion was thus seen as a maneuver by Bank of America to prevent the target’s potential bankruptcy.
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Co., Inc. for $50 billion in September 2008. This deal was clearly made with the aim to save Merrill Lynch
from bankruptcy, thus reflecting investors’ negative expectations and uncertainty about it. Even if this acquisition
made Bank of America one of the largest financial services companies in the world, it was not seen in positively
by many. Bank of America is found to receive C−BAC,NET in January 2009, when its earnings release revealed
massive operating loss of $21.5 billion. Due to this, Bank of America received a $20 billion bailout from the
U.S. government TARP in January 2009 in addition to the $25 billion it received at the end of 2008, which
generated a reception of C−BAC,NET together with a transmission of C+BAC,NET to the financial sector15. Another
peak of C+BAC,NET transmission is found at the end of 2009, when Bank of America announced the TARP debt
repayment. In 2010, Bank of America was accused of fraud by the U.S. government and, thus, again became a
C−BAC,NET receiver. From 2011 to 2014, Bank of America went through a reduction in personnel, which contributed
to an increase in the received C+BAC,NET. Lastly, in August 2014, Bank of America agreed with the U.S. Justice
Department to pay $17 billion to settle toxic mortgage-linked securities claims, which triggered a peak in C−BAC,NET
transmission.
Figure A6: Net Fear Connectedness and AFC - Bank of America
Notes: The figure shows the net positive “fear” connectedness, C+BAC,NET , and net negative “fear” connectedness, C−BAC,NET for Bank of America together with
the AFC, computed as difference between the two. The figure also reports the main specific company events during the time period: [A] FleetBoston Acquisition
Announcement [B] MBNA Acquisition Announcement [C] Banco Ita Acquisition Agreement [D] United States Trust Company Acquisition Announcement [E]
Acquisition of LaSalle Bank Corporation [F] Acquisition of Countrywide Financial [G] Acquisition of Merrill Lynch [H] U.S. TARP Bailout [I] TARP Debt
Repayment [J] Fraud Accusation [K] Downsizing begins [L] Settlement with U.S. Justice Department [M] Scaling Back, Branches Closing. Selected VAR lags =
4 and forecast horizon = 12. The rolling window length is equal to 200 days. The NBER recession periods are highlighted in grey. The selected period spans from
03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
Finally, Figure A7 shows the net “fear” and net AFC for Bank of New York Mellon. The bank was formed only
in July 2007 from the merger of The Bank of New York and Mellon Financial Corporation. The first made several
15The additional bailout was made with the U.S. government’s intention to preserve Bank of America’s stability and merger operation with
Merrill Lynch, thus seen as a stabilizing operation within the financial system.
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acquisitions during the early 2000s, and one of the most important was the acquisition of Ivy Asset Management,
which was reflected in a peak in received C+BK,NET. Both net negative and net positive “fear” are found to be
received at the end of 2001, when profits fell, but there was a confident outlook by the management for the bank’s
future leading position in the financial sector, which may have stimulated the company’s calls trading. In 2003,
the Bank of New York acquired Credit Suisse First Boston’s Pershing LLC for $2 billion, which is reflected in
a clear spike in C+BK,NET received. In 2005, the bank settled a U.S. federal investigation for money laundering
in relation to Russian privatization, resulting in a C−BK,NET reception. In April 2006, an asset-swap agreement
with J.P. Morgan Chase was announced16. This operation was found to result in a C+BK,NET transmission and in
a C−BK,NET reception, meaning that J.P. Morgan Chase likely profited more from the swap than the Bank of New
York. In December 2006, the Bank of New York and the Mellon Financial Corporation announced their merger,
which was finalized in July 2007, for a value of $16.5 billion, becoming the Bank of New York Mellon Corp. and
resulting in a peak of C+BK,NET received since the merger contributed to the creation of one of the largest securities
servicing and asset management companies. The merger was found to contribute to C−BK,NET transmission to the
system due to the increase in competition in the financial sector.
Figure A7: Net Fear Connectedness and AFC - Bank of New York Mellon
Notes: The figure shows the net positive “fear” connectedness, C+BK,NET , and net negative “fear” connectedness, C−BK,NET for Bank of New York Mellon together
with the AFC, computed as difference between the two. The figure also reports the main specific company events during the time period: [A] Ivy Asset Management
Acquisition [B] CSFB’s Pershing Acquisition [C] U.S. Federal Investigation [D] Asset Swaps with J.P. Morgan Chase [E] Bank of New York and Mellon Financial
Corporation Merger [F] Financial Crisis [G] Stress Test Result [H] PNC’s Global Investment Servicing Acquisition [I] Foreign Currency Fraud Lawsuits [J] BNY
Markets Mellon Creation [K] Foreign Currency Fraud Admission. Selected VAR lags = 4 and forecast horizon = 12. The rolling window length is equal to 200
days. The NBER recession periods are highlighted in grey. The selected period spans from 03-01-2000 to 29-12-2017 at a daily frequency.
During the global financial crisis, Bank of New York Mellon fired almost 2,000 employees, accounting for
the 4% of its workforce, which generated an increase in C−BK,NET received. However, the results of the February
16The swap consisted in selling Bank of New York retail and regional middle-market businesses to J.P. Morgan for $ 3.1 billion in return for
J.P. Morgan’s corporate trust business for $2.8 billion, meaning its exit from retail banking.
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2009 stress test by federal regulators indicated that Bank of New York Mellon was one among only three banks
that could have withstood a worsening of the financial situation, and this announcement triggered an increase in
C+BK,NET received. In August 2009, the bank acquired Insight Investment from Lloyds Banking Group, while in
July 2010, it acquired PNC Financial Services’ Global Investment Servicing Inc.; the latter, however, resulted in
a reception of C−BK,NET. C−BK,NET received by Bank of New York Mellon is also found at the end of 2011 and the
beginning of 2012, when the Justice Department filed lawsuits against the bank concerning foreign currency fraud.
The creation of the new Markets Group (BNY Markets Mellon) in June 2014, which combined its global markets,
global collateral services and prime services, is found to generate C+BK,NET received. Conversely, a peak in C−BK,NET
is detected again in March 2015, when Bank of New York Mellon admitted to the allegation of misrepresentation
of foreign exchange pricing and execution.
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